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Learning, Incomplete Contracts and Export Dynamics: 
Theory and Evidence from French Firms 
Abstract 
We consider a model where exporting requires finding a local partner in each market. 
Contracts  are  incomplete  and  exporters  must  learn  the  reliability  of  their  partners 
through experience. In the model, export behavior is state-dependent due to matching 
frictions, although there are no sunk costs. Better legal institutions alleviate contracting 
frictions especially in sectors with large contracting problems. Thus, measures of legal 
quality help reduce the risk that a match between an exporter and a local distributor 
splits, and they are all the more effective in sectors that are more exposed to hold-up 
problems. Moreover, the breaking risk declines with the age of the relationship, as 
unreliable partners are weeded out. We find strong evidence in favor of the model's 
predictions when testing them with a French dataset that includes information on firm-
level exports by destination country. 
Keywords:  Trade  Dynamics,  Learning,  Incomplete  Contracts,  State  dependence, 
Firm-level Trade Data 
 
 
Apprentissage, contrats incomplets  
et dynamique des exportations : 
Modèle théorique et application empirique  
sur un échantillon d’entreprises françaises 
Résumé 
Nous construisons un modèle dans lequel exporter nécessite de trouver un partenaire 
local. Les contrats sont incomplets et les exportateurs font évoluer leurs croyances 
quant  à  la  fiabilité  de  leur  partenaire  au  fur  et  à  mesure  de  la  relation.  Dans  ce 
modèle, les frictions d’appariement génèrent de la dépendance d’état bien qu’il n’y ait 
pas de coûts échoués. De meilleures institutions réduisent ces frictions, en particulier 
dans les secteurs où les risques de défaut sur les contrats sont les plus importants. 
Par conséquent, des mesures de politique publique visant à améliorer la qualité des 
institutions réduisent d'autant plus le risque de rupture de la relation que les secteurs 
sont plus exposés aux risques de défaut. De plus le risque de rupture moyen diminue 
avec l’âge de la relation en raison de l’éviction progressive des partenaires les moins 
fiables. Ces faits stylisés sont en adéquation avec les résultats empiriques obtenus 
sur  un  échantillon  de  firmes  françaises  pour  lesquelles  on  dispose  de  données 
individuelles sur les pays de destination des exportations. 
Mots-clés : Dynamique  des  exportations,  Apprentissage,  Contrats  incomplets, 
Dépendance d’état, Données microéconomiques, Douanes, BRN 
 
Classification JEL : F12, F14, L14 1 Introduction
How do rms establish new export relations and what determines the dynamics of exports
at the rm level? The most prominent models of export dynamics rely on sunk xed costs to
enter the export market. Such costs can explain why only a few very productive rms export
(Melitz, 2003), why rms' export statuses are very persistent over time and why the probability
that a rm exports is determined primarily by its past export status (see Roberts and Tybout,
1997, among others). However, a growing number of micro studies on export dynamics (Eaton,
Eslava, Kugler and Tybout, 2007; Buono, Fadinger and Berger, 2008; Lawless, 2009) have
revealed evidence that is at odds with this view.
First, export values are usually small when a rm breaks into a new market. Second,
most export ows have a very short duration (one or two years), few survive for a longer
period and these export relationships with longer durations grow fast. This leads to hazard
rates of export relationships that sharply decrease over time and fast growing export values
conditional on survival. Finally, a novel stylized fact, which we uncover in the present paper,
is the positive relation between persistence of export ows and the quality of legal institutions
in the destination country.
We argue that it is crucial to consider that exports at the rm level are relationship-specic
in order to explain these observations. Most exporters neither sell a perfectly homogeneous
good that can be sold in an organized exchange nor own a distribution network in the export
destination. As a result, exporters need to rely on partners in each market. These are either
trade intermediaries, distributors that locally market the exporter's product, or foreign rms
that import the exporter's product to use it as an intermediate input.
In our model, rms that want to start exporting to a specic country have to search for a
partner in that destination. When an exporter is matched with an importer, she is initially
uncertain about the importer's reliability. Contracts are incomplete, so that some partners
may try to hold up the exporter. Whether an importer has incentives to do so depends on the
value of the short term gains from holding up the partner relative to the value of maintaining
a long term relationship. This depends { among other things { on the importer's type (patient
or impatient), the exporter's productivity, the extent of sectoral contracting frictions and the
quality of legal institutions in the destination country. Patient importers suciently value
3future prots from any relationship to respect contracts with all exporters. On the other hand,
impatient importers try to renegotiate contracts ex post if contracting frictions are severe (the
payo from renegotiation is large), legal institutions are weak (the opportunity to renegotiate is
strong) and exporters are relatively unproductive (the expected value of future prots is low).
Since exporters have to learn their partners' type through experience, uncertainty is initially
large and thus export values are small. As an exporter observes that the contract is respected
she becomes more condent that her partner is reliable and the value of exports grows.
The combination of these ingredients leads to several interesting patterns. Here, we focus
on the more important ones. First, matching frictions generate persistence (state dependence)
in export decisions, even though there are no sunk costs in the model. An exporter is unwilling
to give up a partner unless she is sure that the importer is unreliable. Second, better legal
institutions make it more likely that a given relation survives from one period to the next.
As a consequence, better legal quality leads to more state dependence and reduced hazard
rates. Moreover, this eect is larger the more severe contracting frictions are in a given sector.
Similarly, larger destination market size or higher exporter productivity imply that a given
relationship is more valuable for importers and thus makes it more likely that they will honor
the contract. Hence, state dependence is larger (and hazards are lower) in destinations with
larger markets and for more productive exporters. Moreover, hazard rates decrease with the
age of the relationship because partnerships involving unreliable importers are sorted out, while
relations with reliable partners survive in the long run.
We use a panel of roughly 6,600 French manufacturing exporters over 13 years to test these
predictions. Our dataset allows us to improve upon the econometric methodology of previous
research on rm export dynamics (such as Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Bernard and Jensen,
2004). This is because we observe the export value of each plant by destination country, while
other studies only had information on the plants' aggregate export status available. First, we
relate state dependence to institutional quality as measured by four dierent indicators. First,
as our main measure of legal institutions, we employ rule of law by Kaufmann, Kraay and
Mastruzzi (2006), as given in Nunn (2007).1 Second, we use legal quality by Gwartney and
1This is a weighted average of a number of variables (perceptions of the incidence of crime, the eectiveness
and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts) that measure individuals' perceptions of
the eectiveness and predictability of the judiciary and the enforcement of contracts in each country between
4Lawson (2003).2 Finally, we make use of a set of variables collected by the World Bank (World
Bank, 2004). We use data on number of procedures and ocial costs required to collect an
overdue debt. Both variables are scaled and transformed by Nunn (2007) in order to make them
increasing in judicial quality.3 Basic statistics for the dierent institutional quality variables
are reported in Table 1.
We nd that there is strong evidence that state dependence of export decisions is positively
related to institutional quality. Figure 1 illustrates this positive relationship. It presents a
plot of the estimated eect of past export status on today's export probability by destination
country against a measure of the legal quality of the destination country.4 It is apparent that the
coecients of past export status are larger for countries with higher quality legal institutions.
Second, we nd that hazard rates of trade ows are negatively correlated with the destination
countries' legal quality and strongly decrease with the age of the relationship. Figure 2 visualizes
these observations by plotting a non-parametric estimate of the hazard for dierent quartiles of
legal quality. The hazard has a strongly negative slope. While the probability that a trade ow
stops is around 20 percent in the beginning, for trade ows that survive for 9 years the hazard
drops to around ve percent. Moreover, note that the hazard is lower for higher quartiles of
legal quality. Third, export values are initially small and grow with the age of the relationship.
In Figure 3 we depict box plots by age of the relationship.5 The gure shows nicely that median
export sales are initially very small (around 10,000 euros). As relationships get older export
1997 and 1998. The variable ranges from 0 to 1, increasing according to the quality of the institutions.
2This index, which ranges from 1 to 10, measures the legal structure and the security of property rights in
each country in 1995.
3Number of procedures is the total number of procedures mandated by law or court regulation that require
interaction between the parties or between them and the judge or court oce. Number of procedures is obtained
as 60 minus the total number of procedures, thus a higher number indicates less procedures and a more ecient
judicial system. This variable ranges from 2 to 49 in our sample. Ocial costs is the sum of attorney fees and
court fees during the litigation process, divided by the country's per capita income. The transformed variable
ranges from 1 to 4.5.
4We use a linear probability model and regress the current export status of each plant on the export status
in the previous year by destination country. This gure is meant to be purely illustrative. We provide more
formal econometric evidence for this relation in the empirical section of this paper.
5The box plot depicts the median and the 25th and 75th percentiles of the distribution of export values, as
well as the minimum and maximum export value. Note that the distribution has a long right tail, with most of
the mass of the distribution being concentrated at very low values.
5values increase substantially.6
We now turn to a discussion of the related literature. While there is a growing body of
research on the rm-level dynamics of exporting, we are not aware of an alternative explanation
that can explain all the empirical facts emphasized in this paper. A large empirical literature,
which builds on the classical hysteresis models by Baldwin and Krugman (1989) and Dixit
(1989), focuses on sunk costs as the main reason for state dependence of exporting decisions.
The seminal contribution is Roberts and Tybout (1997) using data on Colombian exporters,
followed, among other studies, by similar evidence for the US by Bernard and Jensen (2004).
These papers estimate reduced form models for export decisions and show that past export
status is an important predictor for current export status. In an inuential study, Das, Roberts
and Tybout (2007) perform a structural estimation of a model with heterogeneous rms and
sunk costs to quantify the size of sunk entry costs to start exporting. They estimate these
costs to be substantial for Colombian exporters (around $US 400,000). More recently, Ruhl
and Willis (2008) show that the standard model of rm heterogeneity with sunk costs predicts
export values which are too large upon entry and hazard rates that increase over time, which is
at odds with the empirical evidence. The intuition for these counterfactual predictions is that
in such a model rms enter the export market when they are productive enough to overcome
the sunk cost entry hurdle.
A more recent line of research is motivated by the empirical observations that entry into
export markets usually occurs with small values and that hazards decline with the age of the
relationship. To explain these facts, Eaton, Eslava, Krizan, Kugler and Tybout (2008a) develop
a model of Bayesian learning. In this setting, rms are initially uncertain about their demand
in the export market and therefore start small. If they discover that demand is large they spend
resources in order to reach more consumers and their exports grow fast. This idea is related to
our paper but { since rms sell directly to consumers { their model remains silent on the role
of institutions and contractual frictions for export dynamics.7
Our paper is also strongly related to the literature on relationship-specic trade. In Rauch
6Similar evidence has also been reported by Eaton et al. (2007) for Colombian exporters.
7Other papers that emphasize learning about local demand are Arkolakis and Papageorgiou (2009), as well as
Segura-Cayuela and Vilarrubia (2008) and Albornoz, Pardo, Corcos and Ornelas (2009), who focus on learning
from other exporters (export destinations).
6and Watson (2003) importers are uncertain about the reliability of foreign suppliers. They test
the waters by initially placing small orders, which are followed by large orders if the test is
successful. This leads to small import values at the beginning of the import relationship that
grow as the relationship matures. Besedes and Prusa (2006) nd empirical support for this
using highly disaggregated product-level import data for the US.
The paper most closely related to ours is Araujo and Ornelas (2007). They consider a
model where exporters have to match with a distributor, whose type is unknown and has
to be learned through experience. Some distributors run away with exported goods if they
can. As a consequence, export values are initially small and increase as exporters become
more condent about the reliability of their partners. They also derive results on the role of
institutions on rm-level and aggregate trade ows but they do not investigate their model's
predictions regarding state dependence. Our main theoretical contribution is to extend their
homogeneous rm setup to a setting with heterogeneous rms. This extension is crucial to
bringing the model to the data. The reason is that most of our comparative statics results
depend on rm heterogeneity because they are based on composition eects. For example, the
predictions that state dependence is larger in larger markets, or that institutional quality is
less important for more productive rms are consequences of rm heterogeneity. In addition,
we focus on an incomplete contract interpretation of their setup and we allow sectors to dier
in the extent of their contracting frictions. This gives the prediction that the impact of legal
institutions on state dependence or hazard rates is larger in sectors that are more exposed to
contracting frictions and allows us to also exploit the cross-sectoral variation of our data in the
empirical section. Most importantly, the main contribution of this paper compared to Araujo
and Ornelas (2007) is our careful empirical test of the model's predictions regarding export
dynamics.
Summing up, the contribution of our paper is to provide a micro-foundation for the dy-
namics of exporting at the rm level that highlights the importance of both informational and
contracting frictions. Our model generates state dependence of exporting decisions without
relying on sunk costs, while also being consistent with other stylized facts about exporting
dynamics. In addition, the model has implications for the interaction between state depen-
dence/hazard rates and the quality of legal institutions that dierentiate it from alternative
explanations. We show that these predictions are strongly supported by empirical evidence.
7In the next section we motivate our assumptions on the relationship-specicity of exports
and discuss the model. We also derive a set of testable predictions. In section 3 we present the
data and test the predictions derived in the theory section. The nal section concludes.
2 A Model of Exporting and Learning
In standard trade models exporting is not dierent in nature from being active in the
domestic market { rms can directly sell their goods to consumers. In reality, however, exporters
usually sell their products to a very small number of importers in each foreign market. These
are either distributors who locally market and sell the exporters' products, trade intermediaries,
or foreign rms that use these products as intermediate inputs.
Empirically, many { especially smaller { exporters use importers to sell their goods in foreign
markets. Few products are suciently standardized in order to be sold on an organized market.
Thus, if an exporter wants to penetrate a foreign market she can either market the product
herself { which entails substantial costs for getting to know the local business environment
and setting up a distribution network { or she has to rely on a local partner. Hence, trade is
relationship-specic, since it involves a bilateral relation between an exporter and an importer.
Regarding evidence on the relationship-specicity of trade, Eaton et al. (2008a) combine
Colombian rm-level export data with US import data and show that each Colombian exporter
is involved in a very small number of trade relations with the US. On average, Colombian rms
that export to the US have 1.4 trade relations in the US, 80% of Colombian exporters to the
US have only one relation and 90% at most two relations, providing strong support for the
hypothesis that most trade is relationship-specic. Blum, Claro and Horstmann (2010) provide
similar evidence for Chilean exporters linked to Colombian importers { the median exporting
rm from Chile has only one importer in Colombia. In our model, we abstract from direct
exports to consumers, setting up a distribution network and other forms of intra-rm trade, an
option that is viable only for very large exporters because it requires substantial amounts of
xed investments.8
Informational frictions about the quality and reliability of local partners are important ob-
stacles for exporters, who want to establish in new markets. For example, the U.S. department
8Felbermayr and Jung (2009) report that only 4% of German exporters have wholesale aliates.
8of commerce (U.S. Commerce Department, 2000) advises that \a proper channel of distribution
needs to be carefully chosen for each market," warning potential exporters that they \should in-
vestigate potential representatives or distributors carefully before entering into an agreement."
Some local partners may behave opportunistically if they have incentives to do so and this
depends to a large extent on the quality of the local legal system. Reputation may help to
overcome institutional weaknesses, but it takes time to build up. We now turn to a description
of the model.
2.1 Setup
Consider an economy with two countries, Home and Foreign, and many sectors j = 1;:::;J.
In Home there is a measure M >> 1 of innitely lived producers in each sector j, which
discount the future at rate E. Producers, indexed by f, face a constant marginal cost c to
produce,9 which is rm-specic and drawn from a distribution G(c) with support on (0;1).
Each rm produces a dierentiated variety and is a monopolist for that specic variety. If a
producer wants to export she cannot sell her goods directly to Foreign consumers but needs to
form a partnership with an importer located in Foreign.
Since we are mainly interested in the formation of export relationships and because the
export decision is independent of behavior in the domestic market (as marginal costs are con-
stant), we disregard the activities of producers in their domestic market.
In each sector, Foreign aggregate demand for each variety produced by a Home exporter is
described by a constant price elasticity demand function q(p) = Ap ", where A is a summary
measure of Foreign market size in sector j.10
In each sector, Foreign is populated by a measure one of innitely lived rms that can
distribute goods produced by Home producers to Foreign consumers, which we call importers.11
Each of them can sell any imported good in that sector to Foreign consumers but cannot
9We omit indices for notational ease whenever this does not cause confusion.
10Such a demand function can be derived in an environment where Foreign consumers love variety and have
Dixit-Stiglitz preferences. We take the Foreign price index and expenditure on each sector as given, implicitly
assuming that the share of Home exporters in Foreign is small so that their impact on the sectoral price level
in Foreign is negligible.
11Alternatively, importers can be interpreted as Foreign manufacturing rms that import intermediate inputs.
9distribute more than one good simultaneously.12 Importers may be of two types that dier
in terms of their discount factor.13 There are patient importers, indexed by H, with discount
factor H and impatient importers, indexed by L, with discount factor L, where L < H.
The type of the importer 2 fH;Lg is private information. The fraction of impatient importers
in the population is 0 in each sector.
In every period, exporters and importers that are not in an export relation decide whether
to look for a partner or to remain inactive. We assume that exporters are in excess supply, so
that the number of exporters that can nd an importer is limited by the number of importers.14
If importers decide to search for a partner they meet an unmatched exporter with exogenous
probability x.
Before a partnership is formed, exporters' marginal cost is unobservable to importers, so
that matching occurs randomly. Only once matched, the importer discovers the marginal cost
of her partner. At the beginning of every period, matched exporters and importers can both
decide whether to maintain the partnership or to dissolve it. If they decide to dissolve it, both
the exporter and the importer cease to be active and are replaced by another set of rms of the
same type.15
12The predictions of the model would not change if importers could distribute more than one good as long as
exporters cannot observe the success of other exporters matched with a particular importer. If exporters could
infer the importer's reliability by observing other exporters the model would become far more complex. Ex-
porters would try to match with importers that are successful with other rms. This would mitigate uncertainty
and reduce the role of contracting frictions. Thus, our model can be seen as an extreme case of uncertainty.
Nevertheless, our empirical results show that legal institutions play an important role for the state dependence
and survival of export relationships.
13While we do not need to take a stand on where dierences in the level of patience come from, one possible
micro-foundation is credit market frictions { if some importers are credit constrained and face higher borrowing
costs they discount future prots at a higher interest rate than importers who do not need to rely on external
funds. Alternatively, we could model importers with dierent xed distribution costs that are unobserved by
exporters and we would still obtain similar predictions.
14This assumption simplies some of the algebra but is not important for the main results. We could alter-
natively assume that importers are in excess supply.
15The assumption that exporters and importers cannot reenter the pool of unmatched rms simplies some of
the analysis but is innocuous given that in equilibrium the pool of available importers and exporters deteriorates
weakly over time. Thus, importers and exporters never have an incentive to wait for a better partner or to
break a relationship because the available pool of partners has improved.
10In each period { if they decide to continue the relationship for another period { the partners
write a simple one-period contract. The contract species an export quantity and an exogenous
split of the current period's surplus.16 The exporter receives an exogenous fraction  of the
current surplus and the remaining fraction goes to the importer. The surplus consists in the
revenue of exporting minus the xed cost to export. In the next stage, exporters produce
the quantity of goods specied in the contract and pay the xed cost, and importers make a
transfer equal to their fraction of the xed cost. After that, the importer may try to hold up the
exporter by renegotiating the split of current revenues if it pays to do so. Importers can make a
take-it-or-leave-it oer in order to appropriate an additional sector-specic fraction j 2 [0;1] of
the part of current revenues that the contract originally assigned to the exporter. j measures
how sensitive a sector is to hold-up problems. This depends on whether the good has been
specically designed for the export market. The exporter's outside option is to sell the good
through a partner in the domestic market with the same revenue split but for a fraction (1 j)
of the original price. The lower price in the domestic market reects the extent to which the
good has been tailored to the export market. If j = 0, the importer cannot appropriate any of
the exporter's share of revenues if she tries to renegotiate because the exporter could easily sell
the good in the domestic market for the same price as in the current relationship. If j = 1, on
the other hand, the good is worthless outside the relationship and the importer can appropriate
all the revenues by renegotiating the contract. We assume that the exporter always accepts the
importer's proposal since she is indierent between accepting and her outside option.
Moreover, the possibility to renegotiate the contract also depends crucially on the quality
of the Foreign legal system, . Importers are ex ante uncertain whether they will nd an
opportunity to renegotiate. They are able to do so with probability (1   ). For example,
they may need to bribe a public ocial in order to get around the conditions stipulated in the
contract and they are unsure whether they can do this successfully. If renegotiation occurs it is
observed by the exporter.17 In the last stage, the exporter ships the quantity of goods specied
16Since we want to focus on the role of reputation for trade relations we do not allow for contracts that can
be used to screen between patient and impatient importers.
17Araujo and Ornelas (2007)'s interpretation for a very similar setup is that importers may try to default on
exporters and run away with the revenues from the sales of shipped goods. This requires that shipments are
made before goods are paid for (trade credit). If importers try to default, they can steal exporters' revenues
and are successful with probability (1 ). Here  is again a measure of the quality of the local legal system. In
11in the contract, goods are sold and the importer transfers a fraction of revenues to the exporter.
Finally, at the end of each period there is a positive probability of exogenous separation,
s 2 [0;1].
2.2 Nash Equilibrium
In this section we study a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game between exporters
and importers described above that involves the following considerations.
In each period t potential exporters decide whether to enter the export market in order
to search for a partner. If an unmatched exporter meets an importer she decides optimally
whether to accept the partner or to continue the search given her marginal cost, her belief
about the partner's type and the strategies of the importers. Any exporter that has a partner
decides at the beginning of each period whether to continue the relation for another period or
to terminate it given her beliefs about the type of the importer. If she decides to continue the
relation, she chooses the optimal quantity to export given her marginal cost c, her beliefs about
the type of the importer and the strategies of the importers.
Importers face a similar set of decisions. If an importer meets an exporter she decides
optimally whether to accept this match and form an export relation or to continue the search
given her belief about the partner's type and exporters' strategies. An importer that has a
partner decides optimally whether to try to renegotiate or to honor the contract given her type,
the exporter's marginal cost and her strategy.
Even though in this innite-horizon setup many perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria exist, we
focus on a Markov-perfect equilibrium, which is especially plausible because of its simplicity.
In any period, beliefs about the importers' type, which follow a Markov process, are sucient
to describe the current state. The equilibrium strategies of exporters and importers depend
only on current beliefs and on current actions.
Given this setup, we show that the equilibrium is characterized as follows: exporters enter
the export market as long as they expect to make non-negative prots given their marginal
this case, one could interpret j as the fraction of revenues nanced with trade credit but we did not nd any
empirical evidence that measures of sectoral dependence on trade credit have any impact on state dependence
or hazard rates. Thus, we prefer the explanation given in the main text and we will focus on the incomplete
contract interpretation of our setup in the empirical section.
12cost, their beliefs, and the importers' strategies. Impatient and patient importers as well as
exporters initially accept any match. Once a match is formed, impatient importers try to rene-
gotiate contracts with unproductive exporters and honor contracts with suciently productive
exporters; in fact, we show that there is a threshold  c, such that they try to renegotiate the
contract if and only if c >  ct. Patient importers, on the other hand, always honor their contracts
with any type of exporter. Exporters who have a partner choose the optimal quantity to export
given the split of the surplus, their beliefs about the type of their partner and the strategy of
importers. Having observed the behavior of their partners, exporters update their belief about
the type of the importer at the end of the period using Bayes' rule. If the exporter discovers
that she is matched to an importer who tries to renegociate the contracts, her expected prots
become negative and she terminates the relationship.
These equilibrium strategies and beliefs imply that suciently productive exporters are in-
dierent to the type of their partner, while less productive exporters fear that an impatient
partner will hold them up if she has the chance. Since exporters cannot distinguish between
patient and impatient importers unless they observe that the contract is renegotiated success-
fully, they stick to the importer as long as the contract is respected. The longer importers have
honored their contracts, the more condent exporters become that their partner is patient.
We now analyze this equilibrium in more detail. Most proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
We start out with the evolution of beliefs.
2.2.1 Beliefs
For the most productive exporters, it is never in the interest of importers to renegociate a
contract, because immediate prots made by expropriating the exporter are always outweighted
by the expected gains of maintaining the relationship with the exporter. For the less productive
ones, the expected future gains are smaller and it can be in the interest of the importer to
renegociate. In general, there must therefore exist a threshold  c such that it is benecial for an
impatient importer to renegociate when c >  c.
Beliefs are modelled only for unproductive exporters (c >  c) since for the productive ones
(c <  c), all importers are equivalent and therefore they are indierent between them.
In equilibrium, exporters with c >  c maintain a partnership as long as they are not certain
13that their partner is impatient. Every period they update their beliefs about the probability
that their partner is impatient according to Bayes' rule.
Let ~  be the subjective probability for these exporters that the importer is impatient and
therefore might not honor the contract. Conditional on having observed a violation (v) of
the contract and given the equilibrium strategies of importers, ~ (v) = 1. Conversely, con-
ditional on having observed that the contract was respected (r) in the previous period, and
since impatient importers honor their contracts with unproductive exporters with probability
, ~ (r) =
Prob(L\r)
Prob(r) = ~ 
~ +1 ~  < ~ . If no renegotiation occurs this does not reveal any informa-
tion about the type of the importer to the exporter, so ~ (r) = ~ . More generally, let ~ it be the
subjective probability of an exporter with c >  c that the importer is impatient in a relationship
of age i that started in period t, then ~ it =
i~ 0t
i~ 0t+1 ~ 0t if no renegotiation has occurred for any
i 2 f0;:::;i   1g and ~ it = 1 otherwise.
In equilibrium, beliefs must be consistent with the actual probabilities of getting an im-
patient partner, such that initial subjective probabilities equal the true fraction of impatient
importers in the number of unmatched importers that are searching for an exporter, ~ 0t = 0t.
Next, we determine the exporters' optimal strategies given the strategies of importers and
exporters' beliefs.
2.2.2 Exporters
In every period, each exporter chooses the optimal export quantity given her type c, her
belief about the type of the importer and the importers' strategies. Remember that in the Nash
equilibrium we are considering, impatient importers try to renegotiate the contracts with rms
with c >  ct and that renegotiation is successful with probability 1   .
The maximization problem of any exporter with c >  ct is therefore given by
max
p (~ ;c >  ct) = max
p f~ [ + (1   )(1   )] + (1   ~ )gp
1 "A   p
 "Ac   f: (1)
These exporters face an impatient importer with subjective probability ~ , who does not respect
the contract with probability (1   ). If the importer does not stick to the contract she can
appropriate a fraction  of the exporter's share of revenues. Variable production costs and a
fraction  of the xed costs always have to be incurred by the exporter.












Total revenue is given by Rev(~ t;c >  ct) =
n
" 1
" [1   ~ (1   )]
o" 1
c1 "A, while exporters'
prots are (~ t;c >  ct) = 
[1   ~ (1   )]Rev(c >  ct)   f.
Note that prices are ineciently high while export quantities and revenues are too low
compared with a monopolist who can directly export his product to Foreign. This reects the
facts that exporters face the full marginal costs of production while receiving only a fraction 
of revenues and their uncertainty about the importer's type. Ceteris paribus, an improvement
in the quality of legal institutions (higher ) increases export quantities and revenues because
it implies less uncertainty about the exporter's behavior.18 Moreover, more severe contracting
problems (higher ) lower export quantities and revenues, since exporters have more to lose in
the case of successful renegotiation.
Similarly, the maximization problem of exporters with c   ct is
max
p (c   ct) = max
p p
1 "A   p
 "Ac   f; (2)
with solution p(c   ct) = "
" 1
c















Rev(c <  ct)   f.
These exporters charge lower prices and sell higher quantities than exporters with c >  ct
both because they are more productive and because they face no risk that impatient importers
may violate the contract.
The implication of incomplete information is that the longer exporters observe no contract
violation, the more condent they become that their partner is patient. As a consequence, they
put more at stake and increase the quantity they export. At the same time, for rms with
c   c, learning plays no role because even impatient importers honor their contracts with these
exporters. Thus, we can state the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Export revenues are increasing in the age of the relationship as long as c >  ct and
constant for c   ct.
Proof: See Appendix.
18There is also an indirect eect of  through its impact on equilibrium beliefs, ~ , which are increasing in .
15Next, dene (c) as the level of  such that exporters with c >  ct make zero per period
prots given their marginal cost c and importers' equilibrium strategies: (c;(c)) = 0. Then
we can state the following lemma:
Lemma 2: Let ~ 0t be non-decreasing in t. Then given importers' equilibrium strategies and
exporters' equilibrium beliefs there is a unique value  (c) 2 [(c);1) such that for all t an
exporter with marginal cost c >  ct accepts any importer she meets as long as ~ 0t   (c).
Moreover, she maintains a partnership if and only if the importer does not violate the contract.
Exporters with c   ct accept any partner for ~ 0t 2 [0;1] and maintain a partnership as long as
the importer does not violate the contract given importers' equilibrium strategies and exporter's
equilibrium beliefs.
Proof: See Appendix.
Lemma 2 states that given her marginal cost an exporter only enters Foreign if her belief
about the probability of meeting an impatient importer is suciently low. Moreover, if the
exporters' subjective probability at the beginning of the relationship that the importer is im-
patient increases weakly over time, it never pays o to wait for a better partner. The reason is
that the expected value of nding a partner in the future is lower than that of nding a partner
today because exporters' per period prots and the probability for the relation to survive are
decreasing in initial beliefs ~ 0t. In addition, an exporter sticks to any importer as long as she
does not observe a violation of the contract. This is because as long as the contract is respected,
she cannot be certain whether her partner is patient or whether the importer did not manage
to violate the contract despite trying to. Each time an importer honors the contract, the ex-
porter becomes more condent that her partner is patient and increases exports, which in turn
increases the value of the relationship. Consequently, it does not make sense to terminate a
relation before a violation of the contract occurs. Very productive exporters with c <  c, on the
other hand, do not fear that contracts are not respected by impatient importers. Thus, their
beliefs about the probability that their partner is impatient do not inuence their decision to
form a relationship.
The least productive exporter that enters the export market and accepts an importer makes
zero prots in expected terms. This denes a cuto marginal cost ~ ct such that ~ 0t =  (~ c). Thus
exporters accept a match if and only if c  ~ ct. To make things interesting, we assume that
16~ ct >  ct. Since impatient importers try to violate contracts with exporters with c   ct, the cuto
marginal cost level is implicitly dened by the following zero prot condition:




i(~ ct; ~ it)
i 1 Y
j=0
(1   ~ jt + ~ jt) = 0: (3)
Here, VE(~ ct; ~ 0t) is the value function for a match for exporters with c = ~ ct. Future prots are
discounted by the exporters' discount factor E, the probability of no exogenous separation
occurring, 1   s, and the subjective probability that the contract is not violated before the
relationship reaches age i,
Qi 1
j=0(1  ~ jt+ ~ jt). This means that the least productive rms that
match are willing to incur initial losses because if contracts are respected export revenues grow
over time and allow these rms to break even in expectations. The following lemma summarizes
the free entry condition.
Lemma 3: Given equilibrium strategies and beliefs there is a ~ ct such that exporters enter the
export market if and only if c  ~ ct.
Since per period prots, (~ ct; ~ it), and the probability that the relationship survives until
age i,
Qi 1
j=0(1   ~ jt + ~ jt), are both decreasing in the subjective probability that the partner
is impatient in the period of the match, ~ 0t, we can establish the following:
Lemma 4: Let ~ 0t be non-decreasing in t. Then the cuto marginal cost ~ ct is non-increasing
in t.
Having described the exporters' equilibrium strategies, we now turn to importers.
2.2.3 Importers
Initially, importers accept any partner because they do not observe the exporters' marginal
cost before they match and because the value of waiting is always smaller than the value of
accepting a partner today. This is because the expected value of a match decreases over time
for two reasons: rst, the surplus from any relation decreases the later the relation starts
because exporters' initial subjective probability that importers are impatient increases; second,
the expected marginal cost of unmatched exporters, Et(c), increases over time and this reduces
per period expected surplus. Lemma 5 summarizes this behavior.
17Lemma 5: Let ~ 0t be non-decreasing in t and let Et(c) be non-decreasing in t. Then, given the
equilibrium strategies and beliefs, importers initially accept any partner.
Proof: See Appendix.
In equilibrium, impatient importers honor contracts with low cost exporters and try to
violate contracts with high cost exporters. Given a suciently high level of patience, L,
renegotiating contracts with productive exporters is not protable because the loss of future
shared revenues is too large compared to current prots from violating the contract. Conversely,
when impatient importers face a less productive partner, future surplus from the relation is not
large enough to compensate for impatience, so impatient importers try to violate the contract.
Lemma 6: Given the equilibrium strategies and beliefs and if L is suciently large, impatient
importers try to violate contracts if and only if c >  ct.
Proof: See Appendix.
Patient importers, on the other hand, value the future suciently in order not to renegotiate
contracts with high cost exporters. They would only renegotiate contracts with producers with
extremely high marginal costs, which do not enter the export market in equilibrium.
Lemma 7: Given the equilibrium strategies and beliefs, patient importers honor contracts with
all exporters that enter.
Proof: See Appendix.
2.3 Industry Equilibrium
In this section we determine how the measure of impatient importers that search for an
exporter, vLt, and the measure of patient importers that search for an exporter, vHt, evolve
over time since they determine ~ 0t and therefore agents' beliefs. In addition, we establish the
evolution of the distribution of unmatched exporters that are searching for an importer, Gu
t(c),
which determines the expected marginal cost of unmatched exporters, Et(c).
Given the laws of motion for vL and vH, which are derived in the Appendix, one can show
that t =
vLt
vLt+vHt is weakly increasing over time and converges to the steady state value SS. The
18intuition is that relations with impatient importers are dissolved both for exogenous and en-
dogenous reasons, while relations with patient importers are dissolved exclusively exogenously,
so that the proportion of impatient importers in the population of unmatched importers in-
creases over time. This veries the assumption on ~ t made in order to derive exporters' and
importers' equilibrium strategies.
Lemma 8: t is weakly increasing in t.
Proof: See Appendix.
Moreover, in the Appendix we also derive the law of motion of the distribution of unmatched
exporters and show that the average cost of unmatched exporters Et(c) is weakly increasing
over time. This conrms the assumption made in previous lemmata. Lemma 9 states this
formally.
Lemma 9: Et(c) is weakly increasing in t.
Proof: See Appendix.
Finally, the industry equilibrium is given by the two dierence equations that describe
the evolution of unmatched patient and impatient importers, as well as the law of motion of
the distribution of exporters matched with patient importers GH(c), the law of motion of the
distribution of exporters matched with impatient importers GL(c) and an equation relating
the population distribution of productivity to the distribution of matched and unmatched
exporters.19 All equations can be found in the Appendix.
2.4 Comparative Statics
Having described the industry equilibrium, we derive a number of comparative statics re-
sults that we will test in the empirical section of the paper. Our main interest is to relate
export dynamics to rm characteristics (productivity), industry characteristics (the severity of
sectoral contracting frictions), destination characteristics (legal institutions, market size) and
their interaction. Thus, we now interpret our model as applying to a world with many export
destinations. We investigate the eect of rm, industry and destination characteristics on the
19Thus, this is a system of 5 dierence equations in vL, vH, GH(c), GL(c) and Gu(c).
19state dependence of export decisions and on hazard rates. For all comparative statics we assume
that the economy is in the steady state, which implies that  c and ~ c are independent of time.
2.4.1 State dependence
Our model predicts that state dependence, dened as the specic eect of having exported
to a destination the previous year on the probability of exporting there in the current year,
is systematically related to rm and destination characteristics. Econometrically, state depen-
dence is captured by the marginal eect of a change in the last period's export status (which is
either one, if a rm has exported to a destination in the last period, or zero otherwise) on the
current export status conditional on rm and destination characteristics.
Let Yt be an indicator variable that equals one if a rm exports to a given destination in
period t and zero otherwise. Given this denition the conditional probabilities of exporting
are:20
P(Yt = 1jYt 1 = 0;c 2 (0;~ c)) =
x(vH + vL)
Mu ;
P(Yt = 1jYt 1 = 1;c;c 2 (0; c]) = 1   s;















where vH (vL) are the steady state measures of unmatched (im)patient importers, Mu is the
total measure of unmatched exporters, gL(c) is the density function of exporters matched with
impatient importers and gu(c) is the density function of unmatched exporters.
Thus, state dependence is dened as:
P(Yt = 1jYt 1 = 1;c;c 2 (0; c])   P(Yt = 1jYt 1 = 0;c;c 2 (0; c]) = 1   s  
x(vH + vL)
Mu ; (4)

















From the above expressions for state dependence we immediately obtain the result that state
dependence is larger for exporters with low marginal costs (with c 2 (0; c]) than for those with
20The derivations can be found in the Appendix.
20high marginal costs (with c 2 ( c;~ c]) because importers always honor contracts with suciently
productive exporters, while there are endogenous separations from exporters with high marginal
costs.
Proposition 1: State dependence is larger for exporters with lower marginal costs.
Next, we establish how state dependence is aected by the export destinations' market size.
We show in the Appendix that state dependence increases according to the market size of the
destination. The reason is that  c is increasing in market size (A) { a larger market increases
the value of a given export relationship and therefore makes it easier to sustain cooperation.
As a consequence, a given level of c is more likely to lie below the level  c from where impatient
importers try to violate contracts. Thus, a given relation is more likely to survive from one
period to the next. We summarize this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 2: State dependence is increasing in the market size of the export destination.
Proof: See Appendix.
We now derive a relation between state dependence and the destinations' legal quality .
An improvement in legal quality increases  c and thus makes it more likely that a relation
involving an exporter with a given c is not aected by endogenous separation and survives from
one period to the next. This is because a higher  lowers the probability that renegotiation
is successful and makes renegotiation less attractive. As a consequence, impatient importers
honor contracts with less productive exporters.21
Moreover, the quality of legal institutions only matters for state dependence for those rela-
tions that involve less productive exporters { contracts with suciently productive exporters
are honored by both types of importers independently of institutional quality. These points are
summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 3: State dependence is increasing in the quality of the export destinations' legal
institutions. Moreover, the impact of legal institutions on state dependence is larger for exporters
with higher marginal costs.
Proof: See Appendix.
21In addition, this also increases the probability that a given relationship survives, even if the importers'
strategy does not change.
21Finally, we compare the impact of an improvement in legal institutions for two sectors that
dier in the extent of their contracting frictions . To consider an extreme case, if  = 0,
importers cannot extract anything from the exporters' share of the surplus. Thus, they always
honor contracts independently of legal quality and an increase in  has no eect on their equi-
librium strategies and on state dependence. If, however,  is large, an improvement in legal
quality implies a large reduction of importers' incentives to renegotiate contracts. As a conse-
quence, many relationships, for which endogenous separations could occur before the change
in , are no longer at risk of being endogenously destroyed and state dependence increases
discretely. The following proposition makes this point more generally:
Proposition 4: The positive impact of legal institutions on state dependence is larger in sectors
with larger contracting frictions (sectors with higher levels of ).
Proof: See Appendix.
2.4.2 Hazard Rate
A further prediction of our model is on the conditional hazard rate, i.e. the probability that
a relationship ends in period i conditional on the exporter's marginal cost c.
The hazard rate is dened as the ratio between the measure of relationships which are
dissolved and the measure of relations at risk. The measure of relations of age i   1 at risk
between exporters with cost c, with c >  c, and impatient importers is vLxgu(c)i 1(1   s)i 1,
while the measure of relationships at risk between these exporters and patient importers is
vHxgu(c)(1   s)i 1. At the same time, the measure of relations of age i that are dissolved in
period i between exporters with cost c, with c >  c and impatient importers is vLxgu(c)i 1(1 
s)i 1[(1 s)(1 )+s] and the measure of dissolved relations of age i between those exporters
and impatient importers is vLxgu(c)(1   s)i 1s.
Thus, the hazard conditional on c for c   c is:
H(c;c   c) =
vLxgu(c)(1   s)i 1s + vHxgu(c)(1   s)i 1s
vLxgu(c)(1   s)i 1 + vHxgu(c)(1   s)i 1 = s: (5)
22Similarly, the hazard conditional on c for c >  c is:
H(c;c >  c) =
vLxgu(c)[(1   s)(1   ) + s](1   s)i 1i 1 + vHxgu(c)(1   s)i 1s
vLxgu(c)(1   s)i 1i 1 + vHxgu(c)(1   s)i 1 (6)
=
vL[(1   s)(1   ) + s]i 1 + vHs
vLi 1 + vH
= s +
vL(1   s)(1   )i 1
vLi 1 + vH
:
We now state a number of comparative statics results on the hazard rate.
Proposition 5: The conditional hazard is decreasing in the age of the relationship for c >  c.
Proof: See Appendix.
The mechanism behind this result is a composition eect { since relations with impatient
importers have a higher probability of separation than those with patient ones, the older the
relationship, the smaller becomes the fraction of surviving relationships that involve impatient
importers.
As can be seen directly from the formula of the conditional hazard, the hazard rate is
lower for more productive exporters. This is because importers do not violate contracts with
productive exporters and all separations from these exporters are exogenous, while impatient
importers try to violate contracts with unproductive exporters, so that there are both exogenous
and endogenous separations. Thus, we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 6: The conditional hazard is increasing in rms' marginal cost.
We can also establish that the conditional hazard is lower in larger markets. The reason is
that in these markets, relations with any given exporter have a larger value because demand is
higher. Thus, the larger the market, impatient importers are more likely to honor contracts for
a given marginal cost of the exporter. This reduces the probability of endogenous separation
for a given c and therefore decreases the hazard.
Proposition 7: The conditional hazard is decreasing in the market size of the export destina-
tion.
Proof: See Appendix.
The next proposition establishes a relation between the hazard and the destination country's
legal institutions.
23Proposition 8: The conditional hazard is decreasing in the quality of the export destination's
legal institutions for suciently young relationships. Moreover, for these relationships an in-
crease in the quality of legal institutions leads to a larger decrease in the conditional hazard in
sectors with larger contracting problems.
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition for this proposition is as follows. An increase in  increases the cuto,  c,
and also reduces the probability of successful contract violation for a given relation for c >  c.
However, for suciently old relationships with c >  c there is also a composition eect that goes
in the opposite direction { more relationships with impatient importers survive and this tends
to increase the hazard.
To understand the mechanism behind the second part of the proposition note that when 
is zero (importers cannot appropriate any of the exporters' revenue share), institutions have
no impact on rms' strategies and thus no eect on the hazard. When  becomes positive,
this is no longer true. In particular, the higher , the more likely an exporter is to be aected
by endogenous separations for a given marginal cost. As a consequence { since better legal
institutions decrease the probability that a given relation lies above the cuto  c and also reduce
contract violation of importers that are matched with exporters with c >  c { an increase in 
has a particularly strong negative eect on the hazard in high  sectors.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data
We use a panel of 6,594 French manufacturing rms that exist continuously and export at
least once in the period from 1993 to 2005. The dataset is administered by the French Statistical
Institute (INSEE) and merges two data sources. One is the customs (Douanes) database which
allows us to precisely observe the exports of each rm to any potential destination.22 The
customs data include records of the value (measured in euros) of all the extra EU shipments
and all the intra EU trade of French rms above a certain value by rm, destination country
and year. Because the reporting threshold for intra-EU trade changed several times over the
22Regrettably, we do not have information whether trade ows are intra-rm.
24sample period, we exclude EU destinations from our main sample to avoid spurious results but
we include them in robustness checks.23 We select the destination countries for which we have
the additional information we need to carry out our analysis. Thus, the nal data set includes
75 countries. The other source is the B en eces R eels Normaux (BRN) database, which provides
very detailed rm-level data on a variety of balance-sheet measures. This allows us to calculate
and control for rm characteristics such as labor productivity. Each rm is assigned to one of 55
manufacturing sectors using the French NES classication system.24 Table 6 reports descriptive
statistics of the rm-level variables for our sample.
We also use several control variables that come from other sources. Data on average real
GDP, real GDP per worker and bilateral real exchange rates for the sample period are from the
Penn World Tables (Mark 6.2) and data on distance from Paris are taken from Rose (2004).
The dierent measures of the quality of legal institutions are described in Section 1.
Moreover, we construct two measures of sectoral relationship-dependence. The rst measure
uses data collected by Rauch (1999), who classies the output of dierent sectors according to
its standardization. Rauch assigns the goods produced by each 4-digit-SITC sector to one of the
three following categories: traded on an organized exchange, reference priced, or neither. Nunn
(2007) argues that this classication is a good measure for the severity of hold-up problems
in a sector, since goods that are neither traded on an organized exchange nor reference priced
are likely to be tailor-made for a specic partner and have little value outside this relationship.
The second measure comes from Nunn (2007) and measures the fraction of inputs used by a
sector that are neither reference priced nor traded on an organized exchange at the 3-digit ISIC
23The reporting threshold for intra EU trade changed several times in the sample period. It went from 250,000
FF to 650,500 FF in 2001 and then was changed to 100,000 Euros in 2002. For extra EU trade, the threshold
is close to 1000 Euros.
24Our data source is the same as that of Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2004) and Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz
(2008b). They report 34,035 exporters for the year 1986 that sell to 113 destinations outside France. We have
less exporters in our dataset for several reasons. First, we exclude intra-EU trade. Second, we require exporters
to exist continuously during the sample period. Third, we have less export destinations. Fourth, we drop
exporters for whom the sector information was missing and we require rms to be both in the Douanes and
in the BRN database and to have info on value added and employment. Finally, we focus on manufacturing
and drop a number of manufacturing sectors for which we are not able to construct the sector-specic variables
discussed below.
25level. This is a measure of relationship-dependence of sectoral inputs rather than outputs, but
sectors that use a lot of specic inputs tend to also produce strongly dierentiated outputs25 and
Nunn's measure has more variation. We convert both measures to the French NES classication.
Table 7 lists both measures of relationship-dependence by sector.
3.2 State Dependence
In this subsection we describe our econometric methodology to measure state dependence
of exporting decisions and we present our empirical results on the correlation between state
dependence and rm, sector and country-characteristics mentioned in the introduction and
derived from our model.
In our main specication, we use a linear probability model to estimate state dependence.
The main diculty when estimating the impact of the past export status on the current one,
is to disentangle the true state dependence from the spurious one. Indeed, when the residuals
are auto-correlated, a naive regression of the export status on its past value would essentially
capture the persistence of unobservables rather than a true eect of the past export status. One
reason why one might think of auto-correlated residuals comes from unobserved heterogeneity
at the rm or country level that is constant over time, such as rms' average productivity or
the market size of the export destination.26 Exploiting the three-dimensional nature (rms,
destinations, time) of our dataset we can also take time-varying rm-level as well as time-
varying destination-specic unobserved heterogeneity into account. Firm-level time-varying
unobserved heterogeneity refers to rm-level supply shocks, such as changes in productivity,
managerial ability, or rm's strategy which may aect a rm's decision to export. Destination-
25The correlation between Rauch's and Nunn's measure in our sample is 0.66. For example, most subcategories
of both Textile Products and Electrical Equipment NEC fall into Rauch's category \neither" (this fraction is
0.76 in both sectors with Rauch's classication), even though electric equipment is probably more likely to be
made specically for a trade partner than a carpet, so the hold up problem should be more severe in the rst
case (Nunn's measure for the fraction of dierentiated inputs is 0.76 for Electrical Equipment NEC against 0.48
for Textile Products at the NES level.).
26Previous articles, which only had information on rms' aggregate export status available, have dealt with
this problem in dierent ways. For example Bernard and Jensen (2004) estimated a linear probability model
in rst dierences using the Arellano-Bond panel IV procedure. Others, such as Roberts and Tybout (1997)
instead used a dynamic random eect probit strategy.
26specic time-varying unobserved heterogeneity captures country characteristics like market size,
openness policies, movements in the exchange rate, or other demand shifts which may inuence
the probability of a rm exporting to a given country.
As a rst step we investigate whether current export status depends on past export status,
even when we control for rm- and destination-specic shocks.
Our basic specication is:
Pr(Yfkt = 1jYfkt 1;Xfkt) = E(YfktjYfkt 1;Xfkt) = 0 + 1Yfkt 1 + ft + kt: (7)
Here Yfkt is a dummy that equals one whenever rm f exports to destination k in period t,
whereas ft and kt are rm-time- and destination-time-specic xed eects. The coecient 1
of equation (7) is a measure of state dependence, since it captures the marginal eect of past
export status on the probability that a rm currently exports to a destination.
To implement the regression, we use a standard double within-transformation. Let Kft be
the total number of destinations of rm f in period t, let Fkt be the total number of rms that
export to destination k in period t, let K be the total number of possible destinations and let F
be the total number of rms. Moreover, let  Yft = 1=K
PK
k=1 Yfkt = Kft=K be the probability
that rm f exports to an average destination in period t, let  Ykt = 1=F
PF
f=1 Yfkt = Fkt=F





f=1 Yfkt = Rt=(FK), be the average probability of exporting in period t, where
Rt is the total number of relationships at time t. Then dene  Yfkt  Yfkt    Yft    Ykt +   Yt =
Yfkt   Kft=Kt   Fkt=Ft + Rt=(FtKt). This transformed variable measures the export status
of rm f to destination k in period t as a deviation from rm f's probability of exporting to
an average destination and the probability of exporting to destination k for an average rm,
adding the average probability to export. Note that this transformation eliminates ft and kt
from specication (7). Dening  Yfkt 1 and  ufkt analogously, we can estimate the transformed
linear probability model by ordinary least squares.27
 Yfkt = 0 + 1 Yfkt 1 +  ufkt: (8)
The rst column of Table 2 tests for state dependence. Indeed, ^ 1 is positive and signicant
27Note that since we do not rely on the time dimension of the panel for our transformation, the lagged
dependent variable does not cause any problems for consistency and we need not use a dynamic panel estimator.
27at the one-percent level. Having exported to a destination in the previous period increases
the probability of exporting in the current period by 64 percentage points compared to a rm
that did not export in the previous period, even when controlling for unobserved eects at the
rm-time and destination-time level.
We now specify the empirical model to test our hypotheses regarding the relation between
state dependence and the quality of legal institutions, market size and rm productivity.
Pr(Yfkt = 1jYfkt 1;Xfkt) =0 + 1Yfkt 1 + 2Yfkt 1  Prodft + 3Yfkt 1  Ak (9)
+ 4Yfkt 1  IQk + ft + kt:
Here, Yfkt 1Prodft is the interaction between last period's export status and rm productivity
(measured as the log of value-added per worker), Yfkt 1  Ak is the interaction between past
export status and eective market size proxies { GDP and distance28 (all in logs) and Yfkt 1IQk
is the interaction between last period's export status and one of the measures of the quality of
legal institutions. We also control for any interaction between past export status and GDP per
capita (in logs) to make sure that our institutional variables do not pick up the eect of that
variable on state dependence.
According to Proposition 1, state dependence is higher for more productive rms. Thus, we
expect 2 > 0. Proposition 2 states that state dependence is increasing in market size, so we
expect GDP to have a positive and distance to have a negative impact on state dependence.
Finally, Proposition 3 implies that state dependence is increasing in legal quality. Therefore,
we expect 4 > 0.
Columns (2) to (5) of Table 2 present results for regression (9).29 Each specication employs
a dierent measure of institutional quality. Turning rst to the eect of rm productivity on
state dependence, we nd that ^ 2 is always positive and signicant at the one percent level.
Moving from the 25th (minimum) to the 75th percentile (maximum) of productivity increases
the marginal eect of the past export status by 3 percentage points (43 percentage points).30
As for the interactions of past export status and the market size controls, distance has a
28It is straightforward to incorporate transport costs, which have a negative eect on eective market size,
into the model.
29All standard errors are clustered by rm-year.
300:03  0:051  (4:2   3:6), 0:43  0:051(11:7   ( 3:2)).
28signicantly (at the one-percent level) negative impact on the eect of past export status, while
GDP has a signicantly positive eect (also at the one percent level).
In all specications, ^ 4, the coecient of the interaction term between past export status
and the dierent measures of legal institutions, is positive and signicant at the one-percent
level. In terms of economic magnitudes, the eect of institutions on state dependence is also
sizeable. For example, moving from the 25th percentile of rule of law to the 75th percentile
increases the eect of past export status on the probability of exporting in the current period
by roughly 2.4 percentage points, while moving from the country with the worst institutions to
the one with the best increases the eect of past export status by around 8 percentage points.31
Note also, that the level of development (measured by log(GDP per capita)) has a signicantly
positive impact on state dependence.
In columns (6) to (9) of Table 2 we add triple interaction terms between past export status,
the dierent measures of legal quality and rm productivity. According to Proposition 3 we
expect this interaction term to be negative since legal institutions should have a smaller impact
on state dependence if exporters are more productive. Indeed, we nd that in all specications
the interaction terms are negative and signicant at the one-percent level, supporting our
hypothesis. The other coecients remain largely unaected, apart from the coecient of past
export status, which now turns negative for some specications. Note, however, that when we
evaluate all the explanatory variables at their sample mean, past export status still has a large
and signicant positive eect on current export status.
Next, we test the prediction of Proposition 4, which states that the eect of legal quality
on state dependence is larger in sectors that are more relationship-dependent. To this end, we
specify the following econometric model:
Pr(Yfkt = 1jYfkt 1;Xfkt) = 0 + 1Yfkt 1 + 2Yfkt 1  IQk + 3Yfkt 1  RDj (10)
+ 4Yfkt 1  IQk  RDj + 5Yfkt 1  Xk + 6Yfkt 1  Xk  RDj + ft + kt;
where Yfkt 1  RDj is the interaction between last period's export status and our measures of
sectoral relationship-dependence and Yfkt 1  IQk  RDj is the triple interaction between last
31The 25th percentile (minimum) of rule of law is 0.4 (0.2) and the 75th percentile (maximum) is 0.6 (0.9)
and ^ 2 = 0:114, so the change in the eect of past export status is given by 0:114(0:6   0   4) = 0:0236 and
0:114(0:9   0:2)  0:08.
29period's export status, legal quality and relationship-dependence. Finally, Yfkt 1  Xk is the
interaction between past export status and other country controls and Yfkt 1 Xk RDj is the
triple interaction between last period's export status, other country controls and relationship-
dependence.
This specication implies that
@Pr(Yfkt=1jYfkt 1=1;Xfkt) Pr(Yfkt=1jYfkt 1=0;Xfkt)
@IQk = 2 + 4RDj,
so we expect 2 > 0 and 4 > 0. An additional advantage of this specication is that it is
less likely to suer from some form of omitted variable bias than the regressions that only
use explanatory variables at the destination level interacted with past export status. Even if
there are omitted country-specic variables that are correlated with institutional quality, there
is no reason to expect 4 > 0, unless this omitted variable has a larger eect in relationship-
dependent sectors.To exclude even this possibility, we interact the sector-specic eect of past
export status with other country controls, such as log(GDP per capita).
Table 3 presents the results for these regressions using both Rauch's and Nunn's measure
of relationship-dependence and our two main measures of the quality of legal institutions, rule
of law and legal quality. The rst two specications use rule of law and do not control for the
triple interaction with other country variables. Again, ^ 2, that measures the direct eect of
institutions on state dependence when RDj is zero, is positive and strongly signicant. Also,
^ 3, that measures the impact of relationship-dependence on state dependence when rule of law
is zero, is negative as expected. More importantly, the coecient of the triple interaction, ^ 4,
is positive and signicant at the one percent level. This implies that legal institutions have a
larger positive impact on state dependence in more relationship-dependent sectors.
In columns (3) and (4) we add a triple interaction with log(GDP per capita) as an additional
control variable. While ^ 2 maintains its positive and signicant sign only in column (4), ^ 4
remains positive and signicant at the one percent level in both specications. Finally, columns
(5)-(8) repeat the previous specications using legal quality. Results are robust to using this
alternative measure of legal institutions.
In the Appendix we show that all results are robust to 1) including EU-destinations in
the sample; 2) using an Arellano-Bond dynamic panel estimator to control for rm-destination
unobserved heterogeneity; 3) estimating a dynamic random eects Probit model. We conclude
that there is strong evidence in favor of propositions 1-4 and now turn to the predictions on
hazard rates.
303.3 Survival Analysis
Our theoretical model makes several predictions on the correlations between hazard rates
of export relations and rm as well as country characteristics. In order to test them, we use
survival analysis methods. An observation is now dened as a spell { the duration of a rm-
country export relation. Before going into the details of our econometric strategy, let us discuss
two features of the data that we have to take care of: existence of multiple spells and right and
left censoring of spells.
First, there are many multiple spells in our sample, i.e., the same rm exports to a given
country repeatedly in dierent time intervals and each of these relations may have a dierent
duration. In our analysis we treat each spell as independent, which is consistent with our
theoretical analysis.32
Second, the original data are censored on both sides. There are right-censored observations
because we observe data until 2005 and many relations are still active in that year. There
are also left-censored observations since in the rst year in our sample we cannot distinguish
between relations which start before that year and new ones. We deal with the left-censoring
problem by considering only those rms that start exporting in the second year for which
we have information in our database or later. Right-censoring is taken into account through
the Cox model, and we add time dummies to control for the dierent starting dates of the
relationships.
We start out with a description of the duration of trade relations. Table 11 reports the
frequency of observations for each possible length of the relations' duration: 77% of all relations
last less than 4 years, with one-year relations accounting for slightly more than half of the
observations. This conrms that the majority of trade relations have a short duration.
In order to test the predictions of the model on the relation between rm productivity and
the hazard rate (Proposition 6), market size and the hazard rate (Proposition 7), as well as
the relation between legal quality and the hazard rate (Proposition 8), we perform a set of Cox
regressions.
32In the model, having previously exported to a destination does not provide any advantage to a rm that
wants to re-enter a destination over a rm that tries to export to a destination for the rst time, since it has to
nd a new importer. Nevertheless, we take care of the multi-spell problem in the robustness checks.
31The assumption of the Cox proportional hazard model is that the hazard is separable be-
tween an arbitrary function of time, h(t), and a part that depends on a vector of explanatory
variables, X. Our specication is the following:
h(t;X) = h(t)exp(0 + 1Prodf + 2Ak + 3IQk + t + j); (11)
where Prodf is the rm average of log value added per worker, the vector Ak contains the logs
of GDP, GDP per capita and distance. IQk is again one of our measures of legal institutions
(measured in logs); t is a dummy for the starting year of each relation, which is the standard
treatment for right-censoring; j takes care of time-invariant sector characteristics that may
drive dierent durations of export relations. Note that since the log of the hazard is linear and
the explanatory variables are measured in logs, coecients can be interpreted as elasticities.
Results for these regressions are reported in Table 4. As predicted, the hazard is strictly
decreasing in all the measures of the quality of the legal system (all variables are signicant at
the one-percent level) and strictly decreasing in rm productivity (also signicant at the one
percent level). We also nd that the market size proxies have the expected sign and are strongly
signicant.33 As for the magnitude of our results, we nd that an increase of rule of law by
100% decreases the hazard by roughly 6%, while a 100% increase in productivity decreases the
hazard by around 10%.
Next we turn to the second part of Proposition 8, which states that the negative impact
of legal institutions on the hazard should be larger in more relationship-dependent sectors. In
order to test this prediction we specify the following hazard:
h(t;X) = h(t)exp(0 + 1Prodf + 2Ak + 3IQk + 4RDj  IQk + t + j) (12)
In this case the marginal eect of IQk on the log-hazard is 3 + 4RDj, so we expect 3 > 0
and 4 > 0. Table 5 presents the results for these regressions using our main measures of legal
institutions, rule of law and legal quality and both Nunn's and Rauch's measure of relationship-
dependence. In the rst two columns we just use sector and start dummies as additional
controls. ^ 3 is negative and signicant at the one-percent level, while ^ 4 is negative but only
33We cluster standard errors at the country-level (in the regressions that focus on country-level dependent
variables) and at the rm level (in the regressions that focus on rm-level dependent variables), and we use
robust standard errors in those specications which include both rm and country characteristics.
32signicant with Nunn's measure. When adding additional country and rm controls in columns
(3) and (4), ^ 3 remains negative but becomes insignicant, while the interaction term ^ 4 remains
stable and becomes signicant at the 5% level for both measures of relationship-dependence.
Results remain similar but are somewhat less signicant when using legal quality instead of rule
of law (columns (5)-(8)).
Our last prediction on hazard rates is that relations become more stable as they mature,
so the hazard should be decreasing with the age of the relation (Proposition 5). Since the
Cox method for estimating the parameters of the proportional hazard model does not require
the specication of the time dependent part of the hazard, there is no parameter that pins
down time dependence. Thus we refer to Figure 4, which plots a kernel smoothing of the
estimated hazard contributions derived from (11) against time. Clearly, the estimated hazard
is decreasing over time. We conclude that the probability for a trade relation to be destroyed
indeed decreases with the age of the relation.34
Finally, we show in the Appendix that results are robust to including EU destinations and
to estimating the model only with single spells. Thus, also the model's predictions on hazard
rates are strongly supported by the data.
3.4 Discussion
One may wonder to what extent our empirical ndings can be explained by alternative
mechanisms rather than one-to-one matching between exporters and importers with incomplete
information. If exporters can match with more than one importer, this should reduce the
inuence of institutions on state dependence and hazard rates, since rms can continue to
export even when relations with one specic partner break up. As Blum et al. (2010) show,
one-to-many matching is only relevant for big exporters. Our nding that institutions matter
less for state dependence and hazards if exporters are more productive is thus also consistent
with one-to-many matching. Alternatively, this result could be explained by the fact that big
exporters are more likely to have their own distribution network and do not need to rely on
34We have also estimated parametric duration models, such as the Weibull model. These models gave very
similar results for the impact of institutional quality and productivity on the hazard, and estimates implied
mostly negative time dependence. Results are available on request.
33local partners in each market. Thus, their export ows should be more persistent and should
depend less on local institutions.
State dependence that is increasing in institutional quality could also potentially be due
to sunk entry costs that are increasing in institutional quality. Still, besides the fact that it
would be dicult to come up with an intuition as to why it should be more costly to enter
a market with better legal institutions (rather than cheaper), a model with sunk costs would
imply that hazard rates should be increasing over time instead of decreasing. State dependence
of export decisions and hazard rates that are decreasing over time are also consistent with
models of learning about local demand (Eaton et al., 2008a; Arkolakis and Papageorgiou, 2009;
Albornoz et al., 2009). However, these models have nothing to say about the role of institutions
and contracting frictions. Finally, one may be concerned that trade ows stop because trade
is replaced by horizontal FDI, which we can not observe in our data. If this mechanism were
important for trade dynamics, however, we would observe hazard rates that would be increasing
over time instead of decreasing. Thus, overall, the empirical evidence lends strong support for
the specic mechanism emphasized in the model.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have explored the links between export dynamics, on the one hand, and
destination countries' institutional quality, rm productivity and sector-specic contracting
frictions, on the other. We have developed a model in which exporting requires rms to nd
a partner in each market. Incomplete information and imperfect enforcement of contracts give
room for reputation and lead to learning by exporters about the reliability of their partners.
This framework leads to several interesting patterns. Matching frictions imply state de-
pendence of exporting decisions in the absence of sunk xed costs. State dependence is larger
and hazard rates are lower in markets with better legal institutions. Moreover, the impact of
legal institutions on state dependence and on hazard rates is larger in sectors that are more
exposed to hold-up problems. We test these predictions using a large panel of French exporters
that provides information on individual rms' exports by destination country. Overall, we
nd strong support for our model { specically, export relations are more stable and there is
more state dependence in countries with better legal institutions, and these eects are larger
34in sectors with more severe contracting frictions. These facts shed light on the importance of
relationship-specicity for explaining the dynamics of trade.
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38A Proofs
In this section we present proofs for the results in the main text.
Lemma 1: Export revenues are increasing in the age of the relation as long as c >  ct and
constant for c   ct.
Proof:
Note that as long as c >  ct, ~  is decreasing in i and revenues are decreasing in ~ . Hence, revenues
are increasing in i. For c   ct there is no learning and therefore revenues are independent of
the age of the relation.
Lemma 2: Let ~ 0t be non-decreasing in t. Then given the importers' equilibrium strategies
and equilibrium beliefs there is a unique value  t(c) 2 [(c);1) such that for all t an exporter
with marginal cost c >  ct accepts any partner whenever she meets an importer and ~ 0t 
 (c). Moreover, she maintains a partnership if and only if the importer respects the contract.
Exporters with c   ct accept every partner for any ~ 0t 2 [0;1] and maintain a partnership as
long as the importer respects the contract given importers' equilibrium strategies.
The proof of Lemma 2 requires the following assumptions: For all  < 1,  > 0 exporters expect
to make losses in every period if their subjective probability that their partner is impatient




" f < 0. We also assume that there exists a c > 0 such that for
all c  c it holds that (r; ~  = 0;c  c) = Ac1 "("   1)" 1  

"
"   f  0. This means that
suciently productive exporters make prots in each period when they believe that importers
are patient with probability one and patient importers respect contracts.
Proof:
Let Pr(0jc)it be the subjective probability that the contract is respected for a relation of
age i that started in period t given rm's marginal cost c, so that Pr(0jc   ct)it = 1 and
Pr(0jc >  ct)it = (1   ~ it + ~ it).
Then ~ VE(~ 0t;c) = maxfVE(~ 0t;c);EWE(~ 0t+1;c)g, where VE(~ 0t;c) = (~ 0t;c)+E(1 s)Pr(0jc)0t
VE(~ 1t;c) is the expected value of entering a partnership and WE(~ 0t+1;c) = ~ VE(~ 0t+1;c)x(vHt+
vLt)=(Mu
t )+WE(~ 0t+2;c)(1 x(vHt +vLt)=(Mu
t ) is the expected value of not entering the part-
nership in period t and waiting for a new business opportunity in the next period.
39By substituting recursively, VE(~ t;c) can be written as:






















@~ 0t < 0.
At the same time,
@VE(~ 0t;c ct)
@~ 0t = 0, since no importer cheats on these exporters. Hence, since ~ 0t
is non-decreasing in t, it is always worth accepting a partner immediately because rejecting a
partner and starting a partnership tomorrow has a weakly lower expected value. Consequently,
we can write ~ VE(~ 0t;c) = maxfVE(~ 0t;c);0g. Now, since by assumption VE(~ 0t = 0;c) =
(~ 0t=0;c)
1 E(1 s)  0 for all c  c and VE(~ 0t = 1;c) =
(~ 0t=1;c)
1 E(1 s) < 0 for all c >  c and since VE(~ 0t) is
strictly decreasing in 0t, we have that for all c >  c there is a unique  (c) such that ~ VE(~ 0t;c)  0
if ~ 0t   (c) and ~ VE(~ 0t;c) > 0 if ~ 0t <  (c). Thus, exporters never deviate to maintaining the
relationship in any period t+i if ~ it = 1 and return to their equilibrium strategy in the following
period because they would make losses in the deviation period t + i, since (~ it = 1;c) < 0.
Moreover, they would also not deviate to ending the relation as long as ~ it <  (c) because they
would forego positive prots.
Similarly, for exporters with c   c, if a renegotiation occurs, they set ~ it = 1, Pr(0jc   ct) = 0
and expect prots VE(~ it = 1;c) =
(~ it=1;c)
1 E(1 s) < 0. Hence exporters stay in a partnership as
long as there is no renegotiation.
Lemma 5: Let ~ 0t be non-decreasing in t and let Et(c) be non-decreasing in t. Then, given the
equilibrium strategies and beliefs, importers initially accept any partner.
Proof:
Impatient importers face the following problem. Let ~ VL(~ 0t) = maxfVL(~ 0t);LWL(~ 0t+1;c)g,
where VL(~ 0t) = [(1   ) + (1   )(1    + )] E(Rev(~ 0t;c)j ct < c  ~ ct)(1   Gu
t( ct)) +
(1   )E(Rev(c)jc   c)Gu
t( ct)   (1   )f +L(1   s)[Gu
t( ct)E(VL(~ 1t;c)jc   ct) + (1  
Gu
t( ct))E(V (~ 1t;c)jc >  ct)] is the expected value of entering a partnership in period t and
WL(~ 0t+1;c) = x~ VL(~ 0t+1) + (1   x)WL(~ 0t+2) is the expected value of not entering the part-
nership in period t and waiting for a new business opportunity in the next period. Then it is
straightforward to show that ~ VL(~ 0t) is decreasing in t. The rst reason is that ~ 0t is weakly
increasing in t, which reduces export revenues Rev(~ 0t;c) for a given c . The second reason
is that Et(c) is weakly increasing in t and this reduces expected revenues as well. Finally, we
40show in the section on industry equilibrium that the probability of matching with an exporter
with c <  c, Gu
t( c), is decreasing in t. Hence, it is always optimal to accept a given partner.
Similarly, for a patient importer we have ~ VH(~ 0t) = maxfVH(~ 0t);HWH(~ 0t+1)g, where VH(~ 0t) =
(1 )[E(Rev(~ 0t;c)) f]+H(1 s)E(VH(~ 1t;c)) is the expected value of entering a partner-
ship and WH(~ 0t+1) = x~ VH(~ 0t+1) + (1   x)WH(~ 0t+2) is the expected value of not entering the
partnership in period t and waiting for a new business opportunity in the next period. Patient
importers accept any partner for the same reason as impatient ones. Waiting does not pay o
because the average revenue of exporters is weakly decreasing in t both because ~ 0t is weakly
decreasing in t and the pool of available exporters weakly deteriorates over time.
Lemma 6: Given the equilibrium strategies and beliefs and if L is suciently large, impatient
importers try to violate contracts if and only if c >  ct.
Proof: The strategy of impatient importers is:
1. to honor contracts for c   c given that exporters believe that contracts are honored. At
 c they are indierent between violating and honoring contracts given these beliefs. Thus,
we assume that impatient importers stick to honoring them.
2. to violate contracts for c >  c given that exporters believe that contracts are violated. At
 c they are indierent between violating contracts and honoring them given these beliefs.
Thus, we assume that impatient importers deviate to honoring them.
Proof of 1: Consider a deviation to violating a contract in period t, and playing the equilibrium
strategy in all other periods given that exporters play their equilibrium strategy and their equi-
librium beliefs.35 Such a deviation is not protable whenever Vt(r;c)  (1 )Revt(c)+(1 
)(1    + )Revt(c)   (1   )f + L(1   s)Vt+1(r;c). Since Vt(r;c) = (1   )(Revt(c)   f),
we can write the previous condition as L(1   s)Vt+1(r;c)  Revt(c). Because Vt+1(r;c) =
(1 )(Rev(c) f)




" 1 Ac (" 1), we can express this con-






L(1 s)(1 )f ]. Note that  c is independent of  and
that  c > 0 if and only if L >

(1 s)(1 +).
35This is the one stage deviation principle for dynamic games. This principle applies also to games with
incomplete information (see Hendon, Jacobsen and Sloth, 1996).
41Proof of 2: Consider a deviation to honoring the contract in period t and playing the equilibrium
strategy in all other periods given that exporters play their equilibrium strategy and have their
equilibrium beliefs. Such a deviation is not protable whenever Vt(v;c)  (1   )(Revt(c)  
f) + L(1   s)Vt+1(v;c). Since Vt(v;c) = (1   )(1    + )Revt(c) + (1   )Revt(c)   (1  
)f + L(1   s)Vt+1(v;c), we have that Revt(c)  L(1   s)Vt+1(v;c). Thus, Vt+1(c) =
P1
i=0 i





~ t+1+i(1   )]" 1c (" 1).















Solving for c, we obtain
c
" 1   c
" 1 =

1   L(1   s)















i[1   ~ t+1+i(1   )]




Note that a sucient condition for the term in brackets to be positive can be found by setting
~ t+1+i = ~ t. Sucient is L >

(1 s)(1 +), which is the same condition as for  c.
Proof that  c   c:
It is easy to show that  c( = 0) < 0 and  c( = 1) =  c. It remains to show that  c( < 1) <
 c( = 1) =  c. First, we need to show that  c is decreasing in ~ . Ignoring the constant before the
term in square brackets, we have
@ c









("   1)[1   ~ t(1   )]" 2(1   )( 1).
Since
@ ~ t+1+i
@ ~ t =
i+1(1 ~ t)
[(i+1 1)~ t+1]2 > 0, the above expression is smaller than  L(1   s)[1    +
(1   )]("   1)[1   ~ t(1   )]" 2(1   ) + ("   1)[1   ~ t(1   )]" 2(1   ) This
expression is negative whenever L >

(1 s)[1 +(1 )]. Hence, this is a sucient condition
for  c to be decreasing in ~ . Therefore, we have that for any  > 0:  c(; ~ t) <  c(; ~ t = 0) =
 c( = 0; ~ t  0) =  c. Since  c does not depend on  and ~ , it follows that for any ~  > 0:
 c( < 1; ~ t) <  c( = 1; ~ t) =  c.
Lemma 7: Given equilibrium strategies and beliefs, patient importers always honor their con-
tracts.
42Proof:
We show that in equilibrium patient importers honor their contracts with all types of exporters,
that is, there exists a  ct >  ct such that for all c   ct we have that prots from honoring the
contract forever are larger than those of a one period deviation from the equilibrium strategy.
The proof is analogous to Lemma 5. It is straightforward to show that  ct >  ct. Since  ct is
increasing in  and H > L, we have that  ct >  ct   ct . Moreover, we assume that parameters
are such that  ct > ~ ct, so that patient importers honor contracts with all exporters that enter.
Lemma 8: t is weakly increasing in t.
Proof:
The law of motion for the measure of impatient importers that are searching for an exporter is
given by:
vLt+1 = (1   x)vLt + [s + (1   s)(1   )Pr( ct)](0   vLt) (13)
A fraction (1   x) of the population of currently unmatched impatient importers vLt does not
nd an exporter and therefore remains inactive. Moreover, a proportion s of the measure of
matched impatient importers is dissolved exogenously. Out of the remaining proportion (1 s)
of the relations that involve exporters with marginal costs larger than  c, Pr( ct), a fraction




(0 vLt) is the total probability that relations
involve a partner with c >  ci conditional on c  ~ ci, taking into account that the threshold
marginal cost as of which impatient importers try to violate contracts,  c, depends on time.
Here, it c  vLixt i 1(1 s)t i 1(1 Gu
i ( ci)) is the measure of matches of impatient importers
with unproductive exporters formed in period i that survive until period t.
A similar dierence equation describes the evolution of the measure of unmatched patient
importers:
vHt+1 = (1   x)vHt + s(1   0   vHt) (14)
It is easy to show that vLt and vHt are both strictly decreasing sequences that converge to
vL =
0[s+(1 )(1 s)Pr( c)]
x+s+(1 )(1 s)Pr( c) and vH = s
x+s(1   0) respectively.
Note that in order to show that t is weakly increasing in t it is sucient to show that
vLt
vHt is










vHt. We show next that
this is always the case.




vHt. Then we must have that (1 0)vLt[1 x (1 s)(1 
)Pr(ct)]+0vHt(x+s 1) > 0(1 0)[s (1 s)(1 )Pr(ct)]. Since vLt  0 and vHt  (1 0)
it holds that (1 0)0[s (1 s)(1 )Pr(ct)]  (1 0)vLt[1 x (1 s)(1 )Pr(ct)]+0vHt(x+
s 1). Hence we have that (1 0)0[s (1 s)(1 )Pr(ct)] > (1 0)0[s (1 s)(1 )Pr(ct)],




vHt must hold, which implies that
vLt
vHt
is weakly increasing in t.
Lemma 9: Et(c) is weakly increasing in t.
Proof:
We rst turn to the law of motion of the distribution of unmatched exporters. Let Mu 
MG(~ c) (1 vL vH) be the measure of unmatched exporters that are looking for an importer.
There are four types of exporters searching for an importer:
 There are Mu   x(vL + vH) exporters which do not nd an importer. Those have a
distribution Gu(c).
 There are s(1   0   vH) exporters that have been exogenously separated from patient
importers, with a distribution GH(c).
 There are s(0   vL) exporters that have been exogenously separated from an impatient
importer, with a distribution GL(c).
 Finally, there are (1 s)(1 )(0 vL) exporters that have been endogenously separated
from an impatient importer, with conditional distribution
GL(c) GL( c)
1 GL( c) 1fc> cg.



































Note that since Gu
t is a c.d.f., Gu
t(0) = 0 and Gu
t(~ ct) = 1. Assume for a moment that  c and
~ c are independent of time. Then it becomes clear that the pool of unmatched exporters is
44worsening over time, because the relative mass of unproductive exporters is increasing over
time. This is because endogenous destruction of relations with impatient importers occurs only
for unproductive exporters (the last term on the right hand side is present only for c >  c), while
exogenous separations { which aect both relations with impatient and with patient importers
{ are random. Thus, the probability mass of the distribution of unmatched exporters shifts
toward the right tail over time. This conclusion continues to hold even if  ct decreases over time.
Hence, the average cost of unmatched exporters, Et(c) =
R ~ ct
0 cdGu
t, is increasing in t as long
as ~ c does not decrease so much that it more than compensates for the shift in the probability
mass to the right tail of Gu
t. We assume that this condition holds and that therefore Et(c) is
increasing in t.
Lemma A1:  c is increasing in A.
Proof:
The proof is straightforward from inspecting the expression for  c. First, there is a direct positive
eect of A on  c. Moreover, there is an indirect eect: an increase in A implies an increase in
Gu( c) (see Lemma A.9) and this implies a drop in vL. To see this, note that vL can be written as
0SSs2+0(1 s)(1 )s
x[s+(1 s)(1 )Gu( c)]+s2+(1 )(1 s)s. Since Gu( c) increases in A because  c increases in A, it follows
that vL is decreasing in A. The decrease in vL implies a drop in SS and thus in ~ . This also
increases  c for suciently large L.
Lemma A2:  c is increasing in .
Proof:
We show that  c is monotonically increasing in  ( > 0 ,  c() >  c(0)): Consider the




1   L(1   s)















i[1   ~ t+1+i(1   )]




Note that ~ t+1+i() =
i+1SS()
(i+1 1)SS()+1 is decreasing in  (SS is decreasing in  { see Propo-
sition 3) and converges to zero as i goes to innity. Consider the terms in the innite sum
in the expression for  c: i+1(1   s)i+1i+1[1   ~ t+1+i()(1   )]" 1 > i+1(1   s)i+10i+1[1  
45~ t+1+i(0)(1 0)]" 1. Hence, the rst term is larger than the second for any i and the distance
between the terms becomes smaller as i increases. Hence, a sucient condition for  c to be
increasing in  is (setting ~ t+1+i = 0):

1   L(1   s)
L(1   s)(1   )f

L(1   s)[1    + (1   )]
1   L(1   s)





1   L(1   s)0
L(1   s)(1   )f

L(1   s)[1    + (1   0)]





Rearranging and simplifying, we obtain




" 1   [1   L(1   s)][1   SS()(1   )]
" 1 >
L(1   s)(   
0):
A sucient condition for this condition to hold is: [1  SS(0)(1 0)]" 1L(1 s)( 0) >
L(1   s)(   0), or, rearranging: SS <
1 ()1=(" 1)
(1 ) .
Lemma A3:  c is decreasing in .
Proof:





1   L(1   s)















i[1   ~ t+1+i(1   )]








1   L(1   s)
















i[1   ~ t+1+i
0(1   )]
" 1   





We also know that ~ t+1+i() =
i+1SS()
(i+1+1)SS()+1 and that SS() is increasing in  since vL is
increasing in . Therefore, the term [1   ~ t+1+i(0)0(1   )]" 1 > [1   ~ t+1+i()(1   )]" 1
and the distance between the terms converges to zero as i goes to innity. Hence, a sucient





, (1   s)(1   )(   0) < [[1   SS()(1   )]" 1   0[1   SS(0)0(1   )]" 1][1  
L(1   s)]
Which can also be written as:
L(1   s) < 1  
(1 s)(1 )( 0)
[1 SS()(1 )]" 1 0[1 SS(0)0(1 )]" 1.
This is strictly smaller than 1  
(1 s)(1 )( 0)
[ 0][1 SS(0)0(1 )]" 1.
Therefore a sucient condition for monotonicity is L(1   s) < 1  
(1 s)(1 )
[1 SS0(1 )]" 1 or L <
1=[(1   s)]  
(1 s)(1 )
[1 SS0(1 )]" 1.
Lemma A4: ~ c is increasing in A.
Proof:
Note that ~ c is dened by:




i(~ ct; ~ it)
i 1 Y
j=0
(1   ~ jt + ~ jt) = 0:









[1   ~ (1   )]"c1 "A   f. Thus, (~ c) increases in A
because of the direct eect of A and because ~  decreases in A (see Lemma A.1).
Lemma A5: ~ c is increasing in .
Proof:
Note that ~ c is dened by:




i(~ ct; ~ it)
i 1 Y
j=0
(1   ~ jt + ~ jt) = 0:





















c1 "A"[1   ~ (1   )]" 1[~    @~ 
@(1   )].
Here, ~  is the direct eect of higher  on prots through less contract violations and @~ 
@(1 )







[(i 1)SS+1]2 . ii 1SS(1   SS) is the positive eect of  on beliefs,
because of lower learning speed, while
@SS
@ < 0 is the negative eect on beliefs through lower
steady state value of . We assume that the second eect dominates the rst one, so that









@ (1   ) > 0.
Lemma A6: ~ c is decreasing in .
Proof:





















[1   ~ (1   )]" 1[ ~ (1   )   @~ 













@ (1   ) < 0.
Steady State Distribution of Exporters
Let Gu(c), GL(c) and GH(c) be, respectively, the distributions of exporters which are un-
matched, matched with patient importers and matched with impatient importers. In the
steady state, the distribution of exporters matched with patient importers is described by
GH(c) = sGu(c) + (1   s)GH(c). Thus Gu(c) = GH(c), which is logical at the steady state
because all separations are exogenous.
The distribution of exporters matched with impatient importers is described as follows. There
are 4 dierent groups: 1) exporters which have been replaced after exogenous separation:
proportion s and distribution Gu(c); 2) exporters which were not exogenously separated with
proportion (1 s). Out of those (1 s)GL( c) have c   c and (1 s)(1 GL( c)) have c >  c; 3) those
which were replaced after endogenous separation: (1   s)(1   GL( c))(1   ) with distribution
Gu(c); 4) those which were not endogenously separated: proportion (1   s)(1   GL( c)).
We further distinguish between c   c and c >  c:
For exporters with c   c we have GL(c) = sGu(c)+(1 s)GL(c)+(1 s)(1 GL( c))(1 )Gu(c),
while for exporters with c >  c: GL(c) = sGu(c)+(1 s)GL( c)+(1 s)(1 GL( c))(1 )Gu(c)+
(1 s)(GL(c) GL( c)). Hence, GL(z) is dierent from Gu(z) because impatient importers get
rid of the less ecient exporters.
Finally, we can write the population distribution as a weighted average of the distribution of
the three types of exporters:
MG( c) =(0   vL)G
L( c) + (1   0   vH)G




L( c) + (M
u + 1   0   vH)G
u( c)
48At  c we can express GH( c) = Gu( c), GL( c) =
Gu( c)[s+(1 s)(1 )]
s+(1 s)(1 )Gu( c) , vL =
0[s+(1 s)(1 )(1 GL( c))]
x+s+(1 )(1 s)(1 GL( c)),
Mu = MG(~ c)   (1   vH   vL). Substituting this into (16), we obtain a quadratic equation in
Gu( c), that implicitly denes Gu( c):
MG( c) = [G
u( c)]
2 f
[MG(~ c)   0]g + G
u( c)f
0 + MG(~ c)   MG( c)
g; (17)
where  = (x + s)s + (1   s)(1   )s and 
 = (1   s)(1   )x.
Lemma A7: Gu(c) is increasing in .
Proof:














[2Gu( c)(MG(~ c)   0)   (MG( c)   0)] + MG(~ c),
B = MGu( c)
 + M,
D = (1   s)sM[Gu( c)G(~ c)   G( c)] + (1   s)xGu[Gu(MG(~ c)   0)   (MG( c)   0)].
This derivative is positive provided that the following sucient conditions hold. A sucient
condition for E > 0 and D > 0 is Gu( c) >
G( c)
G(~ c), implying that the fraction of unmatched
exporters that lie below the contract violation cuto must be suciently larger than the fraction








is g( c) @ c
@ > g(~ c) @~ c
@Gu( c), implying that the contract violation cuto  c must be suciently
responsive to a change in  compared to the entry cuto ~ c.
Lemma A8: Gu(c) is decreasing in 
Proof:




















we assume that jg( c) @ c
@j > jg(~ c) @~ c
@Gu( c)j.
Lemma A9: Gu(c) is increasing in A.
Proof:




















we assume that g( c) @ c
@A > g(~ c) @~ c
@AGu( c).
Derivation of State Dependence
We have that
P(Yt = 1jYt 1 = 0) =
x(vH + vL)
Mu ;
P(Yt = 1jYt 1 = 1;c   c) =1   s;
P(Yt = 1jYt 1 = 1; c  c  ~ c) =P(Yt = 1 & HjYt 1 = 1; c  c  ~ c)
+P(Yt = 1 & LjYt 1 = 1; c  c  ~ c)
=P(Yt = 1jYt 1 = 1; c  c  ~ c;H)P(HjYt 1 = 1; c  c  ~ c)
+P(Yt = 1jYt 1 = 1; c  c  ~ c;L)P(LjYt 1 = 1; c  c  ~ c);
and that
P(Yt = 1jYt 1 = 1;c; c  c  ~ c;H) = 1   s;
P(Yt = 1jYt 1 = 1;c; c  c  ~ c;L) = 1   (s + (1   s)(1   ));
P(HjYt 1 = 1;c; c  c  ~ c) =
P(c; c  c  ~ cjYt 1 = 1;H)P(HjYt 1 = 1)
P(c; c  c  ~ cjYt 1 = 1)
;
P(c; c  c  ~ cjYt 1 = 1;H) = g
u(c);
P(HjYt 1 = 1) =
1   0   vH
1   vL   vH
;
P(c; c  c  ~ cjYt 1 = 1) =
0   vL
1   vL   vH
g
L(c) +
1   0   vH




P(HjYt 1 = 1;c; c  c  ~ c) =
gu(c)(1   0   vH)
gL(c)(0   vL) + gu(c)(1   0   vH)
;
and similarly,
P(LjYt 1 = 1;c; c  c  ~ c) =
gL(c)(0   vL)
gL(c)(0   vL) + gu(c)(1   0   vH)
:
50Thus,
P(Yt = 1jYt 1 = 1; c  c  ~ c) = (1   s)
gu(c)(1   0   vH)
gL(c)(0   vL) + gu(c)(1   0   vH)
+
[1   (s + (1   s)(1   ))]
gL(c)(0   vL)
gL(c)(0   vL) + gu(c)(1   0   vH)
:
Simplifying, we obtain
P(Yt = 1jYt 1 = 1; c  c  ~ c) =







gu(c). Since for c   c:
G
L(c) = sG
u(c) + (1   s)G
L( c) + (1   s)(1   G
L( c))(1   )G
u(c) + (1   s)(G
L(c)   G
L( c));
we obtain for c   c
g
L(c) = sg
u(c) + (1   s)(1   G
L( c))(1   )g






s + (1   s)(1   )(1   GL( c))
1   (1   s)
Proposition 2: State dependence is increasing in the market size of the export destination.
Proof:
We have shown in Lemmas A.1 and A.4 that  c and ~ c are increasing in market size (A). Let us
compare two destinations, k and k0, with Ak > A0
k. Without loss of generality, assume that the
following ordering holds:  ck0 <  ck < ~ ck0 < ~ ck. Then we can compare state dependence across
intervals.
Firms with c 2 (0; ck0] face only exogenous separations in both countries, thus:
P(Yt = 1jYt 1 = 1;c;c 2 (0; ck0]) P(Yt = 1jYt 1 = 0;c;c 2 (0; ck0]) = 1 s 
x(vH+vL)
Mu for k;k0.
Firms with c 2 ( ck0; ck] experience both endogenous and exogenous separations in the small
country k0, while they face only exogenous separations in the large country k:
P(Yt = 1jYt 1 = 1;c;c 2 ( ck0; ck])   P(Yt = 1jYt 1 = 0;c;c( ck0; ck]) = 1   s  
x(vH+vL)
Mu for k,






51Firms with c 2 ( ck;~ ck0] have endogenous and exogenous separations in both countries:






Firms with c 2 (~ ck0;~ ck] only export to the large country and thus state dependence is not dened




0. Thus, state dependence cannot be compared for those rms that do not export to both
destinations.
As we can see from the above expressions, for any rm c state dependence is either similar in
both markets or discretely larger in the bigger market.
While we do not think that general equilibrium eects that impact on state dependence in-
directly through changes in G(~ c), Gu( c) and vL are particularly relevant, we also show that
the model is consistent with state dependence to be increasing in market size within a given
interval.
Note that
@P(Yt = 1jYt 1 = 1;c; c  c  ~ c)
@A
=



























(1 0 vH) >< 0. This is because
(0 vL)
(1 0 vH) is increasing
in A (since vL decreases in A) and
gL(c)
gu(c) is decreasing in A, since GL( c) =
[s+(1 s)(1 )]
[s=Gu( c)+(1 s)(1 )]
increases in A (because Gu( c) is increasing in A) and thus 1 GL( c) decreases in A. The total
eect depends on which of the two eects is stronger. Moreover, we have that









is decreasing in A, since vL is decreasing in A and G(~ c) is increasing in A.
Proposition 3: State dependence is increasing in the quality of the export destinations' legal
institutions. Moreover, the impact of legal institutions on state dependence is larger for exporters
with higher marginal costs.
Proof:
52We compare two destinations k and k0 with k < k0. We have already shown that  c and ~ c
increase in . Thus, without loss of generality, assume that  ck0 <  ck < ~ ck0 < ~ ck.
Firms with c 2 (0; ck0] face only exogenous separations in both destinations. Thus,
P(Yt = 1jYt 1 = 1;c;c 2 (0; ck0])   P(Yt = 1jYt 1 = 0;c;c 2 (0; ck0]) = 1   s  
x(vH+vL)
Mu for k;k0
Firms with c 2 ( ck0;~ ck0] face both endogenous and exogenous separations in the country with
low , while they only face exogenous separations in the destination with high .






P(Yt = 1jYt 1 = 1;c;c 2 ( ck0; ck])   P(Yt = 1jYt 1 = 0;c;c 2 ( ck0; ck]) = 1   s  
x(vH+vL)
Mu for k.
Firms with c 2 ( ck;~ ck0] experience endogenous and exogenous separations in both countries.






Firms with c 2 (~ ck0;~ ck] export only to country k. Thus, state dependence cannot be compared
across destinations for rms with c > ~ ck0 because state dependence is not dened for those rms
in country k0 (see Proposition 2).
For the impact of  on state dependence within a given interval, note that
@P(Yt = 1jYt 1 = 1;c; c  c  ~ c)
@
=
(1   s)[(   1)@L
@ + L(1 + L)]
[1 + L]2 > 0:
Thus, there is a direct eect of higher : a given relation is more likely not to be destroyed.

















(1 0 vH). This eect is
ambiguous since
(0 vL)




[1 (1 s)]2 is ambiguous. This is because, on the one hand,
more relations survive and this increases the mass of exporters matched to impatient importers.
On the other hand,  c shifts up and this decreases the probability of contract violations. We
assume that the overall eect is positive.
Proof of claim that
@vL
@ < 0:
vL can be written as
0s2+0(1 s)(1 )s




[Gu( c)   1]0xs(1   s)[s   (1   s)(1   )]  
@Gu( c)
@ 0s(1   s)(1   )[s + (1   s)(1   )]
fx[s + (1   s)(1   )Gu] + s2 + (1   )(1   s)sg2 :
Therefore, a sucient condition for the expression to be negative is s > (1   s)(1   ). Since
53@Gu( c)
@ > 0 we have that
@vL
@ < 0. Moreover,






















@ x[G(~ c)M   1]   x(vH + vL)M
@G(~ c)
@
[G(~ c)M   1 + vH + vL]2 < 0:
These observations imply that state dependence is also increasing in  within a given interval.
This proves that for any rm state dependence is larger in countries with higher .
For the second part of the proposition, note that  only matters for state dependence via its
impact on the probability of surviving as long as c >  ck0, else  only aects the probability of
nding a partner. Thus,  has a larger impact on state dependence for less productive rms.
Proposition 4: The positive impact of legal institutions on state dependence is larger in sectors
with larger contracting frictions (sectors with higher levels of ).
Proof:
We compare the impact of a small improvement in legal institutions (from k0 to k) for two
sectors that dier in the extent of their contracting frictions. Suppose that we compare state
dependence for two sectors: sector j0 with large contracting frictions (high ) and sector j with
low contracting frictions (low ). We have shown that  c and ~ c are both increasing functions of
 and decreasing functions of . Hence, we have that  ck0 <  ck and ~ ck0 < ~ ck. We also have that
 cj0 <  cj and ~ cj0 < ~ cj. Suppose that the ordering of cutos is such that  cj0k0 <  cj0k < ~ cj0k0 36
Firms with c below  cj0k0 face only exogenous separations before and after the change in .
Thus, the impact of a change in  works only through a reduction in the probability of nding
a partner and thus increases state dependence in both sectors j and j0.
Firms in [ cj0k0; cj0k]: In sector j0 rms move from endogenous to exogenous separations, while
in sector j they face only exogenous separations before and after the change in .
Firms in ( cj0k;~ cj0k0]: In sector j0 rms face endogenous separations both before and after the
change in , while in sector j the only impact of changing  works through changing the
probability of nding a partner.
36Other orderings of the cutos that give less clearcut predictions are also possible. We focus on this ordering
because it is consistent with the results from our empirical test.
54Firms with c > ~ cj0k0 do not export in sector j0 before the increase in . Thus state dependence is
not dened for those rms and changes in state dependence cannot be compared across sectors
for c > ~ cj0k0.
Proposition 5: The hazard is decreasing in the age of the relationship.
Proof:





. Since i 1 is decreasing in i, H(c;c >  c) is decreasing
in i.
Proposition 7: The conditional hazard is decreasing in the destination country's market size.
Proof:
Since  c and ~ c is increasing in A, for a given c compare two destinations with Ak > Ak0. Thus,
without loss of generality assume that  ck0 <  ck < ~ ck0 < ~ ck.
Then for c <  ck0: H(c) = s for k;k0.
For c 2 ( ck0; ck]: H(c) = s +
vL(1 )(1 s)i 1
vLi 1+vH for k0; H(c) = s for k.
For c 2 ( ck;~ ck]: H(c) = s +
vL(1 )(1 s)i 1
vLi 1+vH for k;k0.
Finally, the hazard is not dened in destination k0 for c > ~ ck.
Moreover, within an interval note that vL is decreasing in A and thus
@H(c;c> c)
@A < 0.
Proposition 8: The conditional hazard is decreasing in the quality of the legal system for
suciently young relationships. Moreover, for those relationships an increase in the quality
of the legal system leads to a larger decrease in the conditional hazard in sectors with larger
contracting problems.
Proof:
Proof of part 1: Since  c and ~ c are increasing in , for a given c compare two destinations with
k > k0. Without loss of generality, assume that  ck0 <  ck < ~ ck0 < ~ ck.
Then for c <  ck0: H(c) = s for k;k0.
For c 2 ( ck0; ck]: H(c) = s +
vL(1 )(1 s)i 1
vLi 1+vH for k0; H(c) = s for k.
For c 2 ( ck;~ ck0]: H(c) = s +
vL(1 )(1 s)i 1
vLi 1+vH for k;k0.
Finally, the hazard rate is not dened for c > c~ k0 and thus cannot be compared.
55Moreover, within an interval note that H(c;c >  c) is decreasing in  for age i suciently small.
For i = 1, H(c) = s +
vL(1 s)(1 )
vL+vH , and @H
@ =  (1   s)
vL
vL+vH < 0.
Proof of part 2: We compare the impact of a small improvement in legal institutions (from k0
to k) for two sectors that dier in the extent of their contracting frictions. Suppose that we
compare state dependence for two sectors: sector j0 with large contracting frictions (high ) and
sector j with low contracting frictions (low ). We have shown that  c and ~ c are both decreasing
functions of . Hence, we have that  cj0 <  cj and ~ cj0 < ~ cj. Moreover,  c and ~ c are increasing in
. Suppose that the ordering of cutos is such that  cj0k0 <  cj0k < ~ cj0k0 <  cjk0 <  cjk.37
For c   cj0k0: there is no eect of a change in  in sectors j and j0, since H(c;c <  cj0k0) = s.
For c 2 ( cj0k0; cj0k]: in sector j0 H changes from H(c) = s +
vL(1 )(1 s)i 1
vLi 1+vH to H(c) = s. In
sector j there is no eect on the hazard.




vL+vH < 0. In sector j the hazard does not change.
For c > ~ cj0k0 the hazard is not dened in sector j0 for k0 and thus changes in hazard rates
cannot be compared.
B Robustness Checks
B.1 Robustness Checks State Dependence
Here, we present several robustness checks of the state dependence results. We rst add
EU destinations to our sample, then we implement an Arellano-Bond dynamic panel estimator,
which allows us also to control for rm-country xed eects and nally, we present results from
using a random eects dynamic Probit model instead of a linear probability model.
B.1.1 Including EU-destinations
In Table 8 we add EU destinations to the sample. In columns (1)-(4) we present results
for specication (9). All results continue to hold and the interactions of past export status
37Other orderings of the cutos that give less clearcut predictions are also possible, in particular, we require
 cj0k <  cjk0 and ~ cj0k0 <  cjk0 for our prediction to hold unambiguously. We focus on this ordering because it is
consistent with the results from our empirical test.
56with legal institutions, market size and productivity remain positive and highly signicant. In
columns (5)-(8) we add sector interactions and present results for specication (10). Again, the
triple interactions between past export, legal institutions and relationship dependence remain
positive and highly signicant. Thus, our results are robust to including EU destinations.
B.1.2 Arellano Bond Dynamic Panel Estimator
One could argue that the residuals might still be auto-correlated even after controlling
for rm-time and country-time xed eects because of rm-destination (relationship-specic)
specic unobserved heterogeneity. In order to control for rm-destination xed eects, we
employ the Arellano-Bond panel IV estimator (Arellano and Bond, 2001).
The specication is
Pr(Yfkt = 1jYfkt 1;Xfkt) = 0+1Yfkt 1+2Yfkt 1Prodft+3Yfkt 1Ak+4Yfkt 1IQk+ft+kt+fk:
(18)
Using again the double-within transformation and taking time dierences, we eliminate all
unobserved heterogeneity. Since the lagged export status is correlated with the lagged residuals,
lagged changes in export status need to be instrumented. We use as instruments the three-
period lag of export status in order to account for even the possibility of an MA(1) auto-
correlation of the residuals in addition to the rm-country xed eects which are taken into
account through rst dierentiation.
We perform the estimation year by year but unfortunately, this method proves a lot less
powerful in terms of identication than the one without rm-country xed eects, which is a
common issue with the Arellano-Bond method due to the weakness of the instruments. The
coecients of the variables of interest usually have the right sign but they are often non signif-
icant. As an example, we provide the results obtained with the data for changes between 1999
and 2000 in Table 9, for which most of the coecients exhibit some statistical signicance. In
columns (1) to (4) we present results for our baseline specication (9). Note that the inter-
actions with legal and rule of law have the correct signs and are signicant, while number of
procedures and cost are insignicantly dierent from zero. The interactions with market size
and productivity are mostly insignicant and sometimes exhibit the wrong sign. In columns
(5)-(8) we add triple interactions between past export status, institutions and productivity.
57This improves the results by increasing the magnitude and the signicance of the legal quality
interactions. Moreover, as expected, the triple interactions with productivity are negative and
signicant.
B.1.3 Dynamic Random Eect Probit
As a nal robustness check, we estimate a dynamic random eect probit model. We specify
Pr(Yfkt = 1jYfkt 1;Xfkt) = (0 +1Yfkt 1 +2Yfkt 1 IQk +3Yfkt 1 Xfkt +4Xfkt +fk);
(19)
where Xfkt are observables and fk is unobserved heterogeneity. Since any non-linear estimator
needs to integrate out the unobserved heterogeneity, the question is how to treat the observa-
tions in the initial period. We follow Wooldridge (2005) and estimate the joint distribution of
(Yfk1;:::;YfkT), conditional on the initial conditions Yfk0 and observables Xfk = (Xfk1;:::;XfkT)
with conditional maximum likelihood methods. We thus need to specify a density h for fk





We assume that the unobserved heterogeneity follows a Normal distribution with expectation
fk = 0 + 1Yfk0 + 2Yfk0  IQk + 3Yfk0  Xfk0 + 4IQk + 5  Xf + 6  Xk and variance 2. Here
Xfkt contains value added per worker, the bilateral real exchange rate and market size proxies,
 Xf is the time average of rm productivity and  Xk are time averages of our market size proxies.
This implies that Yfkt given (Yfkt 1;:::;Yfk0;Xfk) follows a Probit model.
Pr(Yfkt = 1jYfkt 1;Yfk0Xfkt) = 





where the superscripts denote multiplication by (1 + ^ 2) 1=2. Results for this specication
are presented in Table 12. Note that the sign of the interaction term between past export
status and institutional quality is given by the sign of _ 2.38 From Table 10 we nd that
the interaction with all our proxies for legal institutions are positive and highly signicant.
38Note that the part of IQk that is part of unobserved heterogeneity must be held constant when com-




@IQk = (Yfkt 1 =
1;Yfk0;Xfkt) _ 2.
58Similarly, interactions with rm productivity and GDP are positive and signicant. Only
the interaction with transport costs, which is also positive and signicant, does not have the
expected sign. We conclude that, overall, there is very strong support for state dependence
being larger in countries with better legal institutions.
B.2 Robustness Checks Survival Analysis
Here, we present robustness checks for the survival analysis results.
B.2.1 Including EU destinations
In Table 12 we provide results for the sample including EU destinations. Columns (1)-(4)
present results for the baseline specication (11). All variables have the expected signs and
are strongly signicant. In columns (5)-(8), we add interactions with relationship-dependence.
Again, all interactions between institutional variables and relationship-dependence exhibit the
correct sign and are signicant.
B.2.2 Multiple Spells
Around 60% of export relationships in our data involve multiple spells. As a nal robustness
check we conrm that the assumption of spell-independence is not biasing our previous results.
Thus, we replicate our analysis using only relationships which involve single spells. The total
number of single spells in our data set is of 49,479 and their length distribution, as well as all
other descriptive statistics, are very similar to the total sample. Results for specications (11)
(columns (1)-(4)) and (12) (columns (5)-(8)) using only single spells are reported in Table 13.
It is apparent that they are indeed very similar to those using the full sample, thus conrming
that multiple spells are not a problem in our framework.
59Sample without EU countries ( 75 countries)
Mean SD Min 25th Pct. 75th Pct. Max
rule of law 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.9
number procedures 28.4 11.9 2 19 37 49
cost 2.9 0.7 1.1 2.4 3.4 4.6
legal 5.3 1.5 2.4 4.5 5.8 9.2
GDP (log) 8.2 1.1 6.5 7.2 8.8 10.3
GDP p.c. (log) -1.6 1.8 -6.1 -2.6 -0.4 4.4
distance (log) 8.2 0.6 6.8 7.9 8.7 9.4
Table 1: Summary statistics II: country variables
60Figure 1: State dependence to be explained by legal institutions.
The gure shows the correlation between the estimated marginal eect of past export status on current export
decisions with rule of law from Kaufmann et al. (2006).
Figure 2: Hazard rate by institutional quality quartile
The legal quality variable is from Gwartney and Lawson (2003). This index, which ranges from 1 to 10, measures
the legal structure and the security of property rights in each country in 1995.
61Figure 3: Nominal export values by age of the relationship

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































64(1) (2) (3) (4)








log(VA/worker) -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
log(GDP) -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.05***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log(GDP p.c.) -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.03***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
log(distance) 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 79,549 79,549 79,549 79,549
Robust YES YES YES YES
Start YES YES YES YES
Sector FE YES YES YES YES
Table 4: Duration: Cox regressions. Explanatory variables are dierent measures of legal
institutions, GDP, per capita GDP, distance and VA per worker.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































66Level N Mean SD Min 25th Pct. Med. 75th Pct. Max
export value (log) rm - year - country 503,336 10.6 2.2 0 8.9 10.4 12.0 21.1
export value (log) rm - year 63,040 12.2 2.6 1.9 10.3 12.2 14.1 21.4
export value (log) rm 6,594 13.9 3.1 4.8 11.8 14.1 16.1 23.5
number of countries rm - year 63,040 8.0 9.7 0 2 4 10 75
number of countries rm 6,594 14.6 14.7 1 3 9 21 75
productivity (log) rm - year 63,040 3.9 0.5 -3.2 3.6 3.9 4.2 11.7
Table 6: Summary statistics I: rm variables
67NES sector name Rauch Nunn
Production, processing and preserving of meat and meat products 0.00 0.36
Man. of dairy products 0.00 0.36
Man. of beverages 0.33 0.73
Man. of grain mill products, starch products, prepared animal feeds 0.50 0.33
Man. of other food products 0.33 0.35
Man. of tobacco products 0.00 0.32
Man. of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 0.90 0.73
Man. of leather and leather products and footwear 0.63 0.57
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 0.56 0.73
Man. of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and botanical products 0.50 0.69
Man. of soap and detergents, perfumes and toilet preparations 0.50 0.52
Man. of furniture 1.00 0.52
Man. of jewelery and musical instruments 1.00 0.60
Man. of sports goods, games, toys and others n.e.c 0.73 0.56
Man. of domestic appliances 0.75 0.68
Man. of television and radio receivers, sound or video recording 1.00 0.82
Man. of optical instruments, photographic equipment, watches and clocks 0.89 0.83
Man. of motor vehicles, bodies and trailers 1.00 0.79
Man. of parts and accessories for motor vehicles 0.50 0.67
Building and repairing of ships and boats 0.57 0.75
Man. of railway and tramway locomotives and rolling stock 0.67 0.68
Man. of aircraft and spacecraft 1.00 0.89
Man. of motorcycles, bicycles and other transport equipment n.e.c 0.57 0.84
Man. of structural metal products 1.00 0.53
Man. of tanks, containers of metal, central heating radiators, boilers, steam generators 1.00 0.61
Man. of machinery for the production and use of mechanical power 0.44 0.82
Man. of other general purpose machinery 0.71 0.78
Man. of agricultural and forestry machinery 1.00 0.63
Man. of machine tools 0.89 0.84
Man. of other special purpose machinery 0.85 0.80
Man. of weapons and ammunition 1.00 0.68
Man. of oce machinery and computers 1.00 0.85
Man. of electric motors, generators and transformers 1.00 0.82
Man. of television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony and line telegraphy 1.00 0.82
Man. of medical and surgical equipment and orthopaedic appliances 1.00 0.78
Man. of industrial process control equipment, instruments for measuring, navigating 1.00 0.84
Man. of glass and glass products 0.85 0.58
Man. of other non-metallic mineral products 0.57 0.43
Preparation and spinning of textile bers, weaving and nishing of textiles 0.50 0.38
Man. of textile articles, except apparel 0.86 0.48
Man. of knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles 1.00 0.38
Man. of wood and wood products 0.57 0.52
Man. of pulp, paper and paperboard 0.25 0.38
Man. of articles of paper and paperboard 0.17 0.46
Man. of basic inorganic chemicals 0.00 0.27
Man. of basic organic chemicals 0.15 0.27
Man. of agro-chemical products, paints and other chemical products 0.89 0.50
Man. of man-made bers 0.00 0.33
Man. of rubber products 0.60 0.58
Man. of plastic products 0.67 0.37
First processing of iron and steel 0.00 0.44
Man. of basic precious and non-ferrous metals 0.06 0.23
Casting of metals 0.00 0.27
Industrial services for treatment of metals 0.43 0.38
Man. of fabricated metal products 0.90 0.62
Recycling 0.80 0.39
Man. of electrical equipments and apparatus n.e.c. 0.86 0.76
Man. of electronic valves, tubes and other electronic components 1.00 0.82
.
Table 7: Sector characteristics.
Fraction of nal goods (Rauch)/ intermediate inputs (Nunn) not sold in organized exchanges and not reference















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































70(1) (2) (3) (4)
Yikt 1 0.163*** 0.178*** 0.045 0.165***
(0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.053)
Yikt 1log(VA/worker) 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.059***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Yikt 1log(GDP) 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.017***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Yikt 1log(distance) 0.048*** 0.050*** 0.057*** 0.047***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)








Observations 5,901,300 5,901,300 5,901,300 5,901,300
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Real exchange rate YES YES YES YES
Productivity YES YES YES YES
Market size proxies YES YES YES YES
Country-Firm unobserved heterogeneity  a la Mundlak YES YES YES YES
Initial conditions  a la Wooldridge YES YES YES YES
Table 10: State dependence Robustness III: Dynamic Random Eect Probit estimator. Indi-
vidual dimension: country-rm; time dimension: time. Dependent variable is export status.
Explanatory variables are past export status and interactions of past export status with dif-
ferent measures of legal institutions, GDP, distance, VA per worker. Additional controls: time
dummies and real exchange rate. Country-Firm heterogeneity modeled  a la Mundlak (1978),
i.e, including time averages of the country and rm-specic variables; Initial conditions modeled
 a la Wooldridge (2005) i.e., including interactions of the initial export status with the other
explanatory variables.
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, **5%, and *10% signicance.













Table 11: Frequency of spells
72(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)








log(rule of law)Nunn -0.09*
(0.05)






log(VA/worker) -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.159*** -0.159***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009)
log(GDP) -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.075*** -0.075***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
log(GDP p.c.) -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.087*** -0.087***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
log(distance) 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.162*** 0.162***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) ( 0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 117,982 117,982 117,982 117,982 117,982 117,982 117,982 117,982
Robust YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Start Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sector FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Table 12: Duration robustness I: Cox regressions: Sample including EU-destinations. Explana-
tory variables are dierent measures of legal institutions and their interactions with sectoral
measures of contracting frictions, as well as GDP, per capita GDP, distance and VA per worker
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, **5%, and *10% signicance.
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log(rule of law)Nunn -0.27***
(0.09)






log(VA/worker) -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** 0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
log(GDP) -0.03*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
log(GDP p.c.) -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.05***
(0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.01) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01)
log(distance) 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 49,479 49,479 49,479 49,479 49,479 49,479 49,479 49,479
Robust YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Start YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sector FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Table 13: Duration robustness II: Cox regressions, only single spells. Explanatory variables are
dierent measures of legal institutions, GDP, per capita GDP, distance and VA per worker.
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, **5%, and *10% signicance.
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